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Abstract 
Through the enactment of Ontario’s Green Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009, 
Ontario has set targets to increase the share of renewable energy. However, 
widespread renewable energy development still faces several barriers. Some of the 
key barriers to adoption, especially for solar photovoltaic technologies, are the high 
up-front installation costs, the lack of attractive financing options and the dominant 
share of nuclear energy in Ontario’s energy mix. This paper examines some of the 
key adoption issues in Ontario and looks at how other jurisdictions have sought 
alternative models for financing renewable energy projects. Using this information, 
a model is proposed for Ontario that will reduce the burden of high up-front 
financing costs for Ontarians with more accessible financing options and a plan for 
addressing the nuclear energy issue.  
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Foreword 
Although my Plan of Study focuses on corporate responsibility to the 
environment, one of its major components is the development of renewable energy. 
Looking specifically at the context of Ontario, the province along with its wholly 
owned corporations must engage in more responsible energy development that 
ensures environmental as well as social benefits. In the Ontario Long Term Energy 
Plan of 2013, it can be observed that renewable energy will play a crucial role in 
Ontario’s future energy mix. However, to make a true shift from nuclear power and 
for greater renewable energy substitution, communities and local residents have to 
become more involved in the production of renewable energy. This will also create 
greater awareness and understanding of the role of renewable energy and its 
benefits to Ontario. Therefore it is important to eliminate the barriers to the 
adoption of renewable energy.  
The purpose of this paper is directly connected with my learning objectives 
in the renewable energy section. The research highlights the key barriers to 
renewable energy and also provides a viable solution. In this paper, I focus 
specifically on the issue of high investment costs of solar photovoltaic technologies. 
By offering financing through the proposed model, local energy distribution 
companies can spur the growth of the green energy economy in Ontario.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
  
Energy has an important role in modern society as it contributes to economic and 
social development (IPCC, 2012). Since the dawn of industrialization, energy has been 
mainly derived from fossil fuels, such as coal, petroleum and natural gas (Goldemberg, 
2012). However, with the growth of industrialized society, the demand and use for fossil 
fuels has increased and has lead to rising levels of greenhouse gas emissions, which causes 
climate change (IPCC, 2012). Renewable energy not only has the ability to satisfy growing 
energy demand but also acts as climate change mitigation strategy (Goldemberg, 2012; 
IPCC, 2012). In addition to the obvious environmental benefits, such as low carbon 
emissions and lack of toxic waste (Pembina Institute, 2013 and OSEA, 2012), renewable 
energy also provides numerous economic benefits, such as the development of the green 
energy industry and the creation of jobs (Gipe and Weis, 2011). Germany is considered an 
excellent example. In 2000, the German government enacted the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz). Since then, the share of renewable energy in 
Germany’s electricity supply has increased to approximately 23 percent (BMU, 2013). The 
share of renewable energy in 2012 was 12.5 percent of total energy consumption in 
Germany (BMU, 2012b).  However, the EEG not only increased the share of renewable 
energy but also spurred economic development. By 2012, the renewable energy sector had 
created more than 382,000 jobs in Germany (BMU, 2012a). Furthermore, this sector is 
rapidly growing in both domestic and export markets.  However, like other energy sources, 
renewable energy is not an energy source without economic and environmental impact. 
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Thus, the development and implementation of renewable energy technologies requires 
careful planning. 
 The purpose of this research is to present a model for Ontario, whereby local energy 
distribution companies within municipalities help make more accessible new financing 
options available to homeowners and provide better services for solar photovoltaic 
projects. In this paper, I will first highlight the current energy landscape in Ontario with 
consideration to the Ontario Long Term Energy Plan of 2013. I will also look at the current 
relevant barriers to the adoption of renewable energy. Then, I will look at financing models 
in other jurisdictions, primarily SolarCity and the PACE program in the United States as 
well as other programs in Canada. These important aspects will set the foundation to 
develop a suitable model. Using the information from the literature review of the above 
stated topics, I will then outline and explain the framework for the proposed model.  
 This paper will mainly consider solar photovoltaics as the feed-in-tariff program 
provides benefits only for solar photovoltaic installations and not for solar water heaters, 
heat pumps, or other energy efficiency installations. Additionally, solar photovoltaics can 
be more easily adopted by a homeowner living in a city, compared to wind turbines, 
because of the logistics, size and cost of this system.    
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Chapter 2: A Brief Overview of Ontario’s Electricity Landscape 
 
 This section will examine the history and evolution of Ontario’s energy landscape. 
History of Energy in Ontario 
The energy sector has played an important role in the growth of Ontario and has 
transformed itself since the early 1900s. In the 1800s, the electricity market had been 
entirely unregulated in Ontario. The province eventually gained jurisdiction over the flow 
of Niagara Falls and in the 1900s, construction was underway to harness the potential of 
electricity from the Niagara Falls for communities in Ontario (McKay, 1983). Then the 
Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, the world’s first publically owned utility 
company, was formed in 1906 to take responsibility for the power generation at Niagara 
Falls and its transmission to other municipalities. However, in 1972, it was converted into a 
Crown Corporation, which turned it into a profit driven organization (McKay, 1983). It was 
also renamed Ontario Hydro.  
Although hydro was the primary source of electricity, Ontario Hydro began 
diversifying into other forms of electricity production, such as coal and nuclear, between 
the 1950s and 1960s (McKay, 1983). Nuclear electricity in Ontario was created not only to 
reduce dependency on fossil fuels, which was spurred by the OPEC oil embargo, but also to 
maintain Ontario’s economic development. 
In 1965, Ontario’s first commercial CANDU nuclear reactor came on line at Douglas 
Point (McKay, 1983).  The nuclear generation then expanded and out of it came the 
Pickering Nuclear Generating Station and later the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station, in 
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1971 and 1977 respectively. The last nuclear plant, the Darlington Nuclear Generating 
Station, began construction in 1978 (WNA, 2014). However, the project experienced 
several delays and though the initial cost estimate was $2.5 billion, the final cost more than 
tripled to $14.4 billion (OCAA, 2011).  
It also became apparent that after many years of constructing energy projects, 
Ontario Hydro had created an unnecessary need for electricity in Ontario. As McKay (1983) 
points out, Ontario Hydro was meeting its internal mandate, which was to increase the 
production of electricity and along with it the need for increased consumption, without 
actually considering the needs of the province.  To reduce these inefficiencies and to put an 
end to the nuclear expansion, Maurice Strong, the then Chairman of Ontario Hydro, was 
tasked with restructuring the company in 1994 (Keith and Stewart, 2004). This would also 
eliminate monopoly and introduce competition in the electricity system (Winfield et al, 
2004). In this way, Ontario began to deregulate its electricity system and the provincial 
government began to privatize Ontario Hydro. In 1998, the company was privatized by the 
Conservative government under the leadership of Mike Harris (Keith and Stewart, 2004). 
This was to be done by means of the Energy Competition Act of 1998, which was passed by 
the provincial government.  
However, by the following year, Ontario Hydro had incurred a $6.6 billion loss and 
was split into five successor groups – the Ontario Power Generation (OPG), Independent 
Electricity System Operator (IESO)1, Hydro One, Electrical Safety Authority and Ontario 
Electricity Financial Corporation (Keith and Stewart, 2004). Hydro One would handle the 
transmission of electricity and the IESO would become responsible for directing the flow of 
                                                        
1 The Independent Market Operator was renamed Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) in 2005. 
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electricity as well as the electricity market. OPG was responsible for the production of 
energy from nuclear reactors, hydro stations, fossil fuel plants and renewable sources 
(OCAA, 2011). At that time, Ontario Hydro’s debt and liabilities amounted to $38.1 billion, 
which was mainly debt from nuclear projects (Winfield et al, 2004). The huge debt of $19.4 
billion that was incurred in the process, known as “stranded debt”, is still being paid off by 
Ontario electricity consumers (OCAA, 2011; OEFC, 2014). In 2010, the province’s stranded 
debt still had an outstanding balance of approximately $15 billion (OCAA, 2011). 
Ontario Green Energy Incentives 
In 2003, most of the electricity used in Ontario was supplied from coal, 
hydroelectricity and nuclear generators, while non-hydro renewable energy sources played 
little to no part of the provincial energy landscape (See Figure 1 below) (Office of the 
Auditor General of Ontario, 2011). However, during the elections that same year when 
Dalton McGuinty was running for Premier of Ontario, he pledged to decrease greenhouse 
gas emissions by shutting down Ontario’s coal-fired plants by 2007 to address the adverse 
health issues caused by emissions (Green, 2007; Clean Air Alliance, 2013). However, this 
date was then moved forward to 2009, but Ontario eventually became coal-free in 2014 
when the Thunder Bay Generating Station burnt its last supply of coal (Green, 2007; Leahy, 
2014). It was also during the elections of 2003 that McGuinty promised to replace the dirty 
coal-fired plants with clean, renewable energy (Spears, 2013a). 
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Figure 1: Installed Electricity Supply Capacity 
 
Source: Office of the Auditor General of Ontario. (2011). Reports on Value-for-Money (VFM) Audits and 
Reviews. 2011 Annual Report. Queen’s Printer for Ontario. 
 
The Liberals kept their promise and were committed to enhancing Ontario’s 
renewable energy portfolio. The following subsections will consider the different types of 
programs that the government of Ontario put in place since 2005 to expand the share of 
renewable energy. 
 
1. Net Metering 
In 2005, the government placed a new regulation that permitted net metering for 
Ontarians (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2005). Net metering is targeted primarily to those 
that produce electricity for their own use from renewable technologies of 500 kW or less 
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(Ontario Energy Board, 2012; Hydro One, 2013a). Any excess electricity generated by the 
producer is provided to the distributor and the producer receives credits on their energy 
bill for the excess generated (Ontario Energy Board, 2012). Net metering is an option for 
those that perceive a benefit in producing and consuming their own energy. 
2. Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program 
In 2006, the province of Ontario introduced the Renewable Energy Standard Offer 
Program (RESOP) that was administered through the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) 
(OSEA, 2012b). The RESOP allowed small-scaled renewable energy producers to receive a 
guaranteed price per kilowatt-hour of electricity sold to the OPA for a 20-year contract 
(Ontario Energy Board, 2012). However, the projects allowed under this program were 
limited to those below 10 MW in size and compensated wind, water and biomass 
technologies with .11$/kWh and solar photovoltaics with .42$/kWh (OSEA, 2012a). 
Although the province had set targets to generate 1,350 MW of renewable energy under 
the RESOP, they only managed to secure contracts for 55 MW of renewable energy 
generated by September of 2008 (Nishimura, 2012). In the following year, on October 1, 
2009, Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) program replaced the RESOP (Ontario Energy Board, 2012). 
3. Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) 
Ontario launched the Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) program and the microFiT program in 
2009 as policy mechanisms, through the enactment of the Green Energy and Green 
Economy Act of 2009, to increase the production of energy from renewable sources 
(CanREA, 2013). Similar to the RESOP, the FiT program allowed renewable energy 
producers to sell the electricity to the grid at a fixed price per kilowatt-hour for 20 years 
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(Ontario Energy Board, 2012). However, unlike the RESOP, the FiT program did not limit 
the projects to those under 10 MW (Ontario Energy Board, 2012). This allowed for much 
larger and faster renewable energy developments. The FiT program catered mostly to 
renewable energy developers with projects (such as bioenergy, wastepower, solar 
photovoltaics and wind) that were larger than 10 kW, whereas the microFiT program was 
geared primarily towards homeowners for projects under 10 kW (OPA, 2013a; OPA, 
2013b). Furthermore, the FiT program offered differentiated prices depending on the type 
of renewable technology that was used.  
 
In the following year, Ontario’s Long-Term Energy Plan of 2010 stated that by 2018, 
10,700 MW or 13 per cent of Ontario’s energy mix would be generated by renewable 
energy sources (Government of Ontario, 2010). The FiT program combined with Ontario’s 
long-term plan was a massive leap towards a more rigorous and ambitious development of 
renewable energy in Ontario.   
 
Ontario’s Long Term Energy Plan  
Ontario’s Long-Term Energy Plan of 2010 stated that renewable would obtain a 13 
percent share in Ontario’s energy mix, however, nuclear power would maintain a 50 
percent share (Government of Ontario, 2010; OSEA, 2012). In the Long Term Energy Plan 
of 2013 (OLTEP), nuclear power accounted for 56 percent but renewable energy (wind, 
solar PV and bioenergy) was only 5 percent (Government of Ontario, 2013). The OLTEP of 
2013 also states that although the construction of the two new nuclear reactors at 
Darlington will not proceed, both the Darlington and the Bruce Generating Stations will 
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begin refurbishment in 2016. Nevertheless, the OLTEP of 2013 focuses on conservation as 
a way to manage rising electricity prices (Weis, 2013). For renewable energy, the OLTEP 
states that by 2025 renewable energy will represent about half of Ontario’s installed 
capacity, i.e. 20,000 MW, and 10,700 MW of wind, solar and bioenergy will be phased in by 
2021. Moreover, the targets for renewable energy will be reviewed annually (Government 
of Ontario, 2013).  Figure 2 shows the role conservation and renewable energy will play in 
the future of Ontario, while at the same time the province will see a decreased reliance on 
nuclear power. 
 
 
Figure 2: Ontario’s Forecast Electricity Production and Conservation, 2032 
 
Source: Government of Ontario. (2013). Achieving Balance – Ontario’s Long-Term Energy Plan. 
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Chapter Summary 
In 2010, only a year after the enactment of the Ontario’s Green Energy and Green 
Economy Act, the installed capacity from renewable energy increased to 2,000 MW (Office 
of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2011). This increase between 2003 and 2010 can be 
observed in Figure 1 taken from the Auditor General Report. Although the increase might 
appear to be immaterial, it indicates that the Green Energy and Green Economy Act was 
relatively successful in increasing the renewable electricity share in Ontario. Furthermore, 
the decision to shut down coal plants in favour of clean energy proves that Ontario’s 
electricity sector can be transformed to include more renewable energy if the problems 
with the status quo are exposed and better solutions are implemented.  
The 2013 OTLEP proves that renewable energy and conservation will play a much 
greater role in the future of Ontario’s energy mix. With Ontario’s aging infrastructure and 
high construction costs of nuclear plants, the phasing out of nuclear power plants is 
essential to open-up significant new market opportunities that enable the province to move 
towards energy production that would add value to Ontario’s economy. Adding new, 
renewable energy also allows Ontario to balance its energy portfolio and reduce 
dependency on one particular type of energy.    
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Chapter 3: Barriers to Renewable Energy 
 
The growing concerns of the impacts of climate change have created a recognized 
need to shift to cleaner forms of energy production, such as renewable technologies. 
Renewable energy can mitigate the impacts of climate change and also provide other social 
and economic benefits, but only if good policies are created to implement them properly 
(IPCC, 2012). Nevertheless, the growth of renewable energy sources still faces many 
barriers when compared to more conventional forms of energy.  
 
Sources: Etcheverry, J., O’Malley, L. and Taylor, L. (2009). Ontario’s Road Map to Prosperity: Developing 
Renewable Energy to its Full Potential. Research Paper written for the Toronto and Region Conservation 
Authority. International Energy Agency. (2011, November). Renewable Energy: Policy Considerations for 
Deploying Renewables. 
 
 
 
 
Barriers to renewable energy: 
• High up-front costs 
• Lack of public awareness (especially related to costs of 
renewable energy technologies) 
• Policy uncertainty (in Ontario due to the minority government) 
• Issue of intermittency and high costs of storage technologies 
• Local opposition to renewable projets (NIMBYism) 
• Lack of adequate infrastructure 
• Inability to develop proper subsidies to promote investment  
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In order to compete with more conventional energy sources, such as coal, natural 
gas and nuclear, renewable energy requires heavy subsidies globally. However, critics often 
leave out the fact that conventional energy, especially the fossil fuel industry, is also heavily 
subsidized. Although subsidies are difficult to calculate, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) claims that global fossil fuel consumption subsidies totalled to $409 billion in 2010 
and increased to $544 billion in 2012 (IEA, 2012; Anderson, 2014). However this is a rather 
conservative estimate. Recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put forth a $1.9 
trillion figure for global fossil fuel subsidies, which factors in the negative externalities of 
energy consumption (IMF, 2013). Regardless of whichever figure is used, renewable energy 
subsidies were only $66 billion in 2010 and increased to about $101 billion in 2012 
(Worldwatch Institute, 2012). Compared to 82% for fossil fuels, renewable sources only 
account for 11% of the global energy supply mix (World Energy Council, 2013). Very few 
figures factor in the negative impacts of fossil fuels on the environment and the global 
climate and the positive benefits of renewable energy. Nevertheless, fossil fuels still remain 
the status quo and 100% shift to renewable energy is still seen as an unrealistic option by 
many. A paradigm shift of this kind faces a lot of resistance by those that stand to lose their 
current market share and therefore the focus on subsidies is often exaggerated to nullify 
the emerging competitors.   
Intermittency is cited as another major criticism for renewable energy, especially 
solar and wind energy, and is often cited by critics as a barrier for renewable energy 
technologies to achieve greater market penetration. Although renewable energy variation 
can be addressed through technical solutions (e.g. storage), good planning and system 
management is required. It should be noted that conventional energy also experiences 
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reliability issues, which include issues like construction costs, demand fluctuations, power 
outages and volatility of fuel costs (Sovacool, 2009). However, the discussion of 
intermittency usually shifts towards energy storage, which is regarded as a necessity if 
renewable sources are to play a major role in energy production. Although energy storage 
options are well developed and available, they also require smart policy solutions to ensure 
that their associated costs and benefits can be addressed to facilitate deployment.  In 
systems where energy storage is not available or where base load generators are not forced 
to come off-line, grid operators are forced to sell power at negative rates at times of high 
renewable energy production. Renewable energy also requires more coordination amongst 
various jurisdictions and different government levels and innovative planning to design 
energy systems and policies that allow for variability and integration amongst energy users 
(e.g. transportation, heating and cooling, electricity users and generators). Since the 
transition to 100% renewables can be technically demanding and very disruptive to the 
business case of established and dominant generators (e.g. fossil fuels and nuclear), it often 
becomes common for most jurisdictions to simply maintain the status quo.  
 
The following sub-sections will reflect and discuss how the barriers to renewable 
energy prevent Ontario from achieving an optimized energy mix. Due to the space and 
scope limitations of this paper, only a sub-group of the most relevant barriers identified in 
the literature will be discussed. 
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1. Politics of renewable energy 
The political landscape of the province with regards to renewable energy can be 
examined in great depth. However, this section will only discuss some of the relevant 
political issues that have hindered the full development of renewable energy in Ontario 
since the Green Energy and Green Economy Act of 2009. 
When the Liberal government came into power in 2003 under the leadership of Dalton 
McGuinty, they declared that they would phase out coal-fired power plants entirely by 
2007. In 2009, the Green Energy and the Green Economy Act (GEGEA) was created in what 
they hoped would revive Ontario’s ailing manufacturing sector and replace them with 
‘green jobs’. The renewable energy created as a result of the GEGEA would also replace the 
energy produced by the coal plants. In this manner, the Liberal Party became the 
champions of green energy in Ontario and the Conservatives have since always opposed 
the GEGEA and the development of renewable energy. However, the Ontario Liberals had 
made these policies reforms under a majority government. In the following election in 
2011, they were only able to form a minority government, which made it challenging and 
caused a lot of uncertainty in the renewable energy sector.  
The implementation of renewable energy policies has faced a lot of backlash. Stokes 
(2013) summarized well the four main political hurdles faced due to the implementation of 
renewable energy policies in Ontario: 
1) Political consensus does not translate to grassroots support  
2) Asymmetries between government and private sectors, especially where renewable 
energy pricing is concerned  
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3) Difficulty maintaining stability in policies to ensure investor confidence while at the 
same time adapting policies to reflect new information 
4) Conflict when multiple jurisdiction pursue same policies simultaneously  
These issues reflect clearly the politics of renewable energy in Ontario since the enactment 
of the GEGEA. The following sub-sections will highlight the specific challenges Ontario has 
faced on the political front. 
Rising energy costs  
In Ontario, the rising costs of electricity have become unavoidable, which in turn 
leads to high electricity bills for the consumer. The costs of refurbishment of nuclear plants, 
costs of new transmission lines and distribution and costs of new power plants all 
contribute to the rising electricity bills (Gorman, 2014). Moreover, though the Debt 
Retirement Charge will end in 2016 and consumers are expected to see annual savings of a 
little under $70, the residential electricity bill is expected to actually increase by $120 in 
the same year (Artuso, 2014). Additionally, the cancelled gas plants in Oakville and 
Mississauga could cost taxpayers up to $1.1 billion (CBC News, 2013b).  
Nevertheless, critics of renewable energy usually place the blame on the high 
subsidies the government offers for renewable energy technologies through the Feed-in-
Tariff program. A recent study, which was sponsored by Environmental Defence Canada, 
actually suggests that renewable energy (solar, wind and bioenergy) makes up only 9 
percent of the consumer’s electricity bill in Ontario, while other forms of energy make up 
48 percent (Blackwell, 2014). Moreover, the Conservatives have, for the most part, opposed 
and criticized the Liberal’s green energy policies on several occasions (Spears, 2014a; 
Howlett, 2011).  In the recent Ontario elections of 2014, Progressive Conservative leader 
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Tim Hudak said that ending the Feed-in-Tariff program would save the province $20 billion 
per year in energy costs, however, he did not mention how he would bring down energy 
prices (Benzie and Brennan, 2014). Furthermore, the savings cited by Tim Hudak were 
completely out of proportion as the total electricity expenditure of the province is only 
$18.7 billion per year (OPA, 2014d).  
Although the rising energy costs have little to do with renewable energy and more 
to do with Ontario’s aging energy infrastructure, green energy policies often come under 
fire as they are perceived as more expensive due to the subsidies they receive. Further, the 
Conservatives have often used this as an excuse to scrap the Feed-in-Tariff incentives that 
promote renewable energy in the province. Until the 2014 election in Ontario, where the 
Liberal’s won a majority, the future of green energy in Ontario had been more or less 
uncertain. 
Wind Energy  
Wind energy, one of the major forms of renewable energy, has an installed capacity 
in Ontario of 4.3 percent or 1,500 MW as of February 2013 (IESO, 2013a; IESO, 2013b). 
Nevertheless, the wind sector has experienced several problems and pushback from local 
communities, which led to political decisions that limit the development of renewable 
energy. 
Ontario Wind Resistance and Save the Bluffs are examples of anti-wind groups in 
Ontario that strongly oppose the development of wind turbines by emphasizing potential 
negative health impacts of wind power to local residents (Ontario Wind Resistance, 2013; 
Save the Bluffs, 2010). However, a 2010 report on the potential health impact of wind 
turbines concluded that scientific evidence shows that there is no direct link between the 
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noise of wind turbine and detrimental health effects (CMOH Report, 2010).  The Chief 
Medical Officer of Health, Dr. Arlene King, stated: 
“According to the scientific evidence, there isn't any direct causal link 
between wind turbine noise and adverse health effects.” (OMOHLTC, 2010) 
 
By emphasizing the adverse impacts of wind turbines, anti-wind organizations have 
created antagonism among residents. However, it is also important to note that most wind 
farms in Ontario are owned and operated by private sector companies, which restricts 
community involvement (Blackwell, 2013). A lack of community ownership fosters 
resistance and scepticism about the benefits of wind energy, which in turn hampers the 
growth of the industry.  
The moratoriums placed on offshore wind energy also provide an insight into the 
politics of renewable energy. To date Ontario has placed two moratoriums on the 
development of offshore wind farms. The first moratorium was placed in 2006 to 
determine the impacts of offshore wind on the surrounding environment (Blackwell, 
2011). After adequate assessment, the government decided to lift the moratorium in 2008 
(Taylor, 2011). This allowed companies that were interested in offshore wind in freshwater 
lakes to bring forth the potential for wind development. Trillium Corp, a company 
interested in wind development, was planning on a 500 MW offshore wind farm in Lake 
Ontario (Spears, 2013b). However, just before the agreement was made, the province 
slammed the second moratorium on February 11, 2011 (Spears, 2013b).  
Since wind farms in freshwater lakes are not common across the globe, with the 
exception of a couple of pilot projects in Sweden and in Lake Erie, Ontario would have been 
a lucrative investment (Taylor, 2011). More investment in the renewable energy sector 
would also lead to economic growth, job creation and a greater share of renewable energy. 
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A Conference Board of Canada paper calculated a potential income between $4.8 and $5.5 
billion from the offshore wind industry to the provincial economy from 2013 to 2026 
(Antunes and Coad, 2010). Additionally, the province of Ontario has at least 2,000 MW of 
easy to develop offshore wind generation capacity (Antunes and Coad, 2010). These figures 
indicate that the 2011 moratorium was indeed a costly mistake and a huge step backward 
for renewable energy development in Ontario. 
Many critics claim that this decision was purely a political move on behalf of the 
Liberal government to win the provincial elections. During the months preceding the 
election of 2011, the Liberal government faced tremendous opposition. Liberal Leader 
Dalton McGuninty was greeted by anti-wind protestors in several communities across the 
province as he had earlier dismissed concerns of residents that opposed wind turbines 
(Blackwell, 2011). The protests had a significant impact on Liberal strongholds and public 
opinion became a primary concern for them, as they wanted to retain power in Ontario. 
Due to the proposed development of offshore wind, several Liberal ridings were under 
threat. Consequently, the election of 2011 became the centre of the policy decision that put 
a halt to the development of offshore wind. The offshore wind moratorium of 2011 was an 
effective tool that was used by the Liberals prior to the elections, enough to temporarily 
pacify the voters and gain their support in the upcoming elections. 
WTO ruling   
In November of 2012, the World Trade Organization (WTO) stated that Ontario had 
breached an international trade agreement through its Green Energy and Green Economy 
Act (GEGEA) (Howlett et al, 2012). The complaint, filed by Japan and the European Union, 
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stated that it forced producers of renewable energy to buy their products and services from 
local companies (Howlett et al, 2012). 
According to the GEGEA, between 2009 and 2011, all renewable energy projects 
were required to have 25 percent domestic content that was produced in Ontario (CBC 
News, 2012a). Beginning in 2012, the local content requirement for renewable energy 
projects increased to 50 percent (CBC News, 2012a). The local content requirement would 
allow the renewable energy industry to flourish in Ontario and create thousands of local 
jobs. Supported by the Government of Canada, Ontario defended its position by stating that 
the energy produced from the projects are procured by the government and it is thus 
exempt from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Neumann, 2012). However, on 
May 6, 2013, Ontario lost its appeal at the WTO and the province was required to adhere to 
the rules set by the WTO (CBC News, 2013a; Spears, 2013c; McCarthy, 2013).  
The WTO ruling was an example of how political conflict arises when other 
countries or jurisdictions create similar targets. The local content requirement was a major 
selling point for the development of the renewable energy sector in Ontario. It would also 
contribute to the economic development of the province by adding 50,000 jobs by 2018 
(Gipe and Weis, 2011). Nevertheless, Ontario’s GEGEA was amended to comply with the 
WTO ruling and all domestic content requirements have been eliminated. Although this 
decision will allow for more price competition and lower costs of technology for the 
consumer, the increased competition could also stifle the growth of the green 
manufacturing sector in Ontario.  
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2. The Staying Power of Nuclear  
In an era of rising concerns of climate change and impacts of greenhouse gases, 
nuclear energy is often praised for its low contribution to greenhouse gas emissions (Butler 
et al, 2011). This ideology is reflective in Ontario’s adamant pursuit of maintaining its fixed 
share of nuclear power. This is evident by the green light given to the refurbishment of the 
Darlington Nuclear plant that will be undergoing repairs in 2016, which only reinforces the 
dominance of nuclear energy (Macleod, 2013).  
The cost of nuclear power 
Ontario’s Long-Term Energy Plans (OLTEP) not only states the government’s 
support for nuclear power over renewable energy in Ontario, but also the province’s 
dependence on nuclear energy. However, the energy debate has been complicated by the 
exorbitant investment the province has made in its nuclear reactors (Weis and Stewart, 
2010).  
Nuclear reactors in Ontario will require extensive repairs and refurbishment as they 
are approaching the end of their lives. These repairs are estimated at approximately $12.9 
billion (Spears, 2014b; Spears 2014c).  By observing historical decisions, it can be deduced 
that the renovations of the reactors always surpass expected costs by substantial amounts. 
When the Darlington nuclear facility was finally constructed, the costs totalled $14.7 billion 
compared to its projected cost of $3.4 billion (David Suzuki Foundation, 2013). Therefore, 
it is expected that the costs for the Darlington refurbishment will be approximately 2.5 
times its estimated costs, ranging between $21.25 and $35 billion (Clean Air Alliance, 
2010).  
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Moreover, the Pickering Nuclear Generation Station (NGS) is the oldest nuclear 
facility in Ontario. Although the operating licenses for Pickering expire in 2014 and 2015, 
which marks their end of life, their licenses have been extended until 2018 (Government of 
Canada, 2014). However, they are a huge cost burden for the province. The operations, 
maintenance and administrative (OM&A) costs for Pickering A and B in 2012 was $145 and 
$226 million, respectively (Power Advisory LLC, 2012). With a grand total of $371 million 
in OM&A costs, Pickering NGS is not only the most expensive nuclear generating station in 
Ontario but also has one of the worst operating records among nuclear plants globally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The high costs of repairing nuclear facilities will directly affect the public, who will 
see high electricity costs in the future. The decision to decommission the Gentilly-2 reactor 
in Quebec proved to be an economically viable option. It was estimated that after the 
refurbishment of Gentilly-2, the electricity produced would cost consumers 5.3 cents per 
kilowatt-hour more than what they are currently paying (CBC News, 2012b). Similarly, an 
increase in electricity costs can also be expected in Ontario if the Darlington plant is 
An opportunity for Ontario 
 
This is an opportune time to shut down Pickering NGS 
immediately. Pickering has a total installed capacity of 
3,094MW (Pickering A – 1,030MW and Pickering B – 
2,064MW) (Power Advisory LLC, 2012). The freed up capacity 
as a result of an early shut down would make way for 2-3GW of 
renewable energy sources.  
If Pickering were to be shut down today, Ontario would save 
approximately $840 million per year, which is 5.3% of 
Ontario’s total electricity costs (OCCA, 2012).  These savings 
could be then reinvested in cleaner, cheaper and more 
decentralized sources of energy production, such as renewable 
energy technologies and new conservation programs. 
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refurbished. Moreover, nuclear reactors also incur large maintenance costs over their 
useful life ultimately making it more expensive than renewable energy sources (OSEA, 
2011). Furthermore, the decommissioning of the Gentilly-2 nuclear plant is expected to 
cost around $1.8 billion (CBC News, 2012b).  
Compared to renewable energy technologies that have seen a significant decline in capital 
costs, the costs for nuclear energy only seem to be increasing (Bridgepoint Group Ltd., 
2012).  Unlike renewable energy that provides direct benefits for its producers and society 
at large with more jobs and a cleaner environment, nuclear energy in effect becomes a 
burden for society with its overwhelming maintenance and decommissioning costs. 
Nuclear lobbies 
It is imperative to state that the nuclear lobbies in Ontario are strong and forceful, 
while the proponents of renewable energy are few and scattered. Although organizations 
such as the Ontario Sustainable Energy Association and the David Suzuki Foundation 
realize Ontario’s potential as a renewable energy leader, the nuclear industry does not fail 
to portray nuclear power as a clean source of energy that contributes to economic 
development.   
In 2011, the general manager of the Organization of Candu Industries, David 
Marinacci stated in defence of the Darlington nuclear plant: 
“these plants would act as a catalyst to rejuvenate the nuclear 
industry and revitalize the Canadian nuclear supply chain, 
creating thousands of high-paying jobs locally and across 
Ontario.” (Spears, 2011) 
This argument represents a one-sided and biased perspective that is absorbed by many 
without understanding the true costs of nuclear energy.   
 23 
Furthermore, the nuclear lobbies have proved to be adroit in campaigning for 
nuclear energy through television commercials (BrucePower4You, 2013). These 
commercials showcase the nuclear reactors in Ontario as a source of employment for the 
many Canadians that depend on it. Additionally, they state that nuclear energy is both clean 
and renewable. This poses a conundrum for renewable energy lobbyists who now have to 
educate the audience about the problematic information distributed by these nuclear 
lobbies.  
 Inflexible energy 
Unlike natural gas plants, nuclear generators are not flexible as they cannot easily 
start and stop their electricity generation. This means that the power output produced by 
nuclear energy cannot be increased or decreased to meet immediate changes in electricity 
demands or electricity generation from variable sources (Mills, 2010). Due to the high 
amount of nuclear energy on the grid, Ontario now has to curb the wind energy production 
that is generated by Ontario wind power companies (Spears, 2013b). Furthermore, when 
there is too little demand, the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) will turn off 
the power generated by these wind turbines and will provide a partial compensation for 
the wind companies (Spears, 2013b). By turning off energy that is produced by a fuel 
source that is free and compensating producers to do so, Ontario is sub-optimizing its 
renewable energy production in favour of nuclear power.    
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3. Consumer affordability of renewable technologies 
An opinion poll conducted in Ontario in November of 2012 that surveyed 1,000 
people showed a strong support for green energy. Nearly 83 percent of the respondents 
stated that it is very important to have renewable energy (Friends of the Earth, 2012). 
Although this survey did not examine why people prefer renewable energy and how it 
compares to conventional sources of energy production, it would suggest that Ontarians 
generally have a positive attitude to renewable energy.  Another survey conducted in the 
Eastern Ontario Highlands revealed that residents strongly supported renewable energy 
technologies, in particular solar technologies (Fast and McLeman, 2012). Nearly 87 percent 
supported solar rooftop installations and 79 percent supported solar farms. Although one 
of the goals of the Green Energy and Green Economy Act (GEGEA) was to increase 
community projects, most of the renewable energy projects in Ontario are owned by large 
companies, unlike Germany, where more than 50 percent of production is owned by its 
citizens (REM, 2012; Blackwell, 2013; Iler and Iler, 2013). While the surveys show that 
Ontarians support renewable energy, there is certainly a lot less public investment in this 
sector.  
 Although the awareness and attitudes toward renewable technologies is usually 
assessed through primary research, a few key facts and statistics can be analyzed to 
determine if Ontarians can actually afford renewable energy technologies. The following 
sub-sections will look at different aspects, such as dwelling, household expenditure, income 
and debt, costs of the technology, which would be considered prerequisites for consumers 
to install renewable energy systems, specifically solar photovoltaics. 
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Residential considerations 
Homes need to fit certain criteria in order for homeowners to install solar 
photovoltaics. In 2011, according to Statistics Canada, approximately 58 percent of 
households in Ontario comprise of what is termed as single detached dwelling (Statistics 
Canada, 2013a). Furthermore, the likelihood of these dwellings being owned by those who 
live there is also high, as nearly 67 percent of all households in Ontario were owned 
dwellings (Statistics Canada, 2013a). Since a good number (39%) of these homes are single 
detached and owned, they would most likely not belong to a condominium society giving 
the owners freedom to install renewable energy technologies as compared to homes that 
are rented or part of a condominium development. 
Household Expenditure, Income and Debt 
1) Expenditure 
The household expenditure shows the monetary amount a household requires to 
meet its needs. The average household in Ontario comprises of 2.6 individuals (Statistics 
Canada, 2013b). The average household expenditure in the province of Ontario was 
$77,554 in 2011 which was the second highest in Canada, after Alberta (Statistics Canada, 
2013c). This shows that Ontarians enjoy a high quality of life. However, the nature of the 
expenses can be better understood by considering the specific categories of expenditure 
(See Table 1 below). For example, household furnishings and equipment, clothing and 
accessories, recreation, tobacco and alcohol, games of chance and miscellaneous 
expenditures, which although are somewhat essential, can be adjusted and reduced. In 
Table 1, it can be determined that Ontarians on an average spend 15.7% of their total 
expenditure on these items, which is not significantly lower than the Canadian average of 
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16.4% (Statistics Canada, 2013d; Statistics Canada, 2013c). If Ontario households spend 
roughly $12,000 each year on such expenditures, a fair assumption can be made that they 
can make some allowance in their yearly expenditure for an investment in renewable 
energy technologies, depending on their preferences. Thereby, the miscellaneous 
expenditure component can be quite variable and flexible. 
 
 
Table 1 – Average household expenditure (Ontario) 
 
Source: Statistics Canada. (2013c, January 30). Average household expenditure, by province (Ontario). 
Retrieved May 2, 2013 from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/famil130g-
eng.htm. 
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2) Income 
Table 2 below breaks down the total income level by the number of individuals in 
each income group. In 2010, nearly 95 percent of Ontarians fell in the ‘under $50,000’ 
income category (See table 2 below) (Statistics Canada, 2012a). The median total income in 
Ontario was $29,520 (Statistics Canada, 2012a). However, the median income for families 
with two or more people was $71,540 compared to the national average of $69,860 in 2010 
(CBC News, 2012c; Statistics Canada, 2012b). Although individual income levels are 
important, the income of families is more relevant in this case as renewable technologies, 
primarily solar photovoltaics are usually applied to detached homes where families 
comprising of two or more people would most likely live. Since the median family income is 
high, compared to national levels, families living in detached or semi-detached homes in 
Ontario probably have a higher likelihood of installing renewable technologies. However, 
the adoption of renewable energy in the residential sector has been slow. 
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Table 2 – Individuals by total income level (Ontario) 
 
Source: Statistics Canada. (2012a, June 23). Individuals by total income level, by province and territory 
(Ontario). Retrieved May 3, 2013 from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-
som/l01/cst01/famil105g-eng.htm. 
 
3) Debt 
Since installing renewable energy systems requires a substantial capital investment, 
it can be expected that a majority of the population would take bank loans to finance their 
projects. The household debt to personal disposable income ratio has been increasing in 
Canada and has recently crossed 150 percent (Chawal and Uppal, 2012). The national 
household debt averaged at $114,400, however, household debt in provinces such as 
Ontario range between $124,700 and $157,700 (Chawal and Uppal, 2012). Although the 
family income in Ontario might be high, a large household debt could prevent households 
from making large capital investments which would impede the adoption of renewable 
technologies. 
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4) Cost of solar photovoltaics 
Although wind energy usually makes up the greatest share of renewable energy 
sources, wind turbines are generally more suited to rural installations or on farmlands due 
to their size, space requirement and need for a wind pattern that is not obstructed by tall 
buildings (CanWEA, 2008). On the other hand, solar panels generally offer urban 
consumers a feasible solution, although it is necessary to know the amount of solar 
radiation a certain location would receive throughout the year. Furthermore, 
approximately 99 percent of microFiT applications are for solar photovoltaics (OPA, 2011). 
A business case for solar photovoltaics is considered in this paper, since it is the most 
popular renewable energy technology 
In this section, the potential costs of installing solar panels on residential rooftops 
are examined based on price quotes from an online vendor in Ontario. Solartrader.ca, a 
website that sells solar energy technologies, provided their prices for a sample of panels. 
These prices varied by the type of module (such as monocrystalline, polycrystalline or thin 
film), the wattage, number of cells, performance and the manufacturer.  
Table 3 is a comparative study of the potential costs of solar panels of three 
different companies.  As illustrated, the total upfront costs to install a 5kW solar 
photovoltaic system are approximately $20,000 that would need to be funded through 
external borrowings.   
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Table 3 – Cost comparisons of solar systems 
 
  Eclipsall Siliken Heliene Average* 
Specifications 
   
 
Approx. size (kW) 5 5 5 5 
Approx. size (W) 5000 5000 5000 5000 
Actual size of system (kW) 4.90 4.90 4.95 4.92 
Cost per panel $239.99 $245.00 $278.82 $255 
Wattage of module (W) 245 245 275 255.00 
Number of panels required 20.41 20.41 18.18 19.67 
Actual number of panels required 20 20 18 19.33 
Costs 
   
 
Panels $4,800 $4,900 $5,019 $4,906 
Racking System $2,815 $2,815 $2,815 $2,815 
Inverter $2,927 $2,927 $2,927 $2,927 
Miscellaneous $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 
Labour $3,375 $3,375 $3,150 $3,300 
Application fee - OPA $500 $500 $500 $500 
Application fee - Local energy 
company $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 
HST $2,329 $2,342 $2,328 $2,333 
Total upfront costs $20,246 $20,359 $20,239 $20,281 
Energy Generation 
   
 
Avg. sunlight in Toronto/year (hours) 1025 1025 1025 1025 
Optimal generation of system 
(kWh/year) 5023 5023 5074 5040 
Average generation (kWh/year) 4730 4730 4778 4746 
*Average of the three numbers in the columns Eclipsall, Siliken and Heliene 
(Refer to Appendix 1 for a detailed breakdown of the calculations, assumptions and references) 
 
Costs 
The cost of a 245W polycrystalline panel manufactured by Eclipsall costs 
approximately $240, and a similar panel by Siliken costs $245 (Solar Trader, 2014a; Solar 
Trader, 2014b). However, the cost of a 275W polycrystalline Heliene panel is about $280 
(Solar Trader, 2014c). For example, if a homeowner were to install a 5kW system 
(approximation), it would require a set of 20 panels from Eclipsall and Siliken, which would 
cost $4,800 and $4,900 respectively, and $5,019 for 18 Heliene panels. Installing a solar 
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system also requires a racking system, inverter, miscellaneous materials and labour costs 
for installation of the solar photovoltaics which are significant. Furthermore, there are 
costs for the application fees of the FiT program and the Connection Impact Assessment 
together with the Harmonized Sales Tax. The total costs amount to approximately $20,000 
for a 5kW system, which would be the amount a homeowner would need to borrow from 
the bank if they cannot directly pay the upfront costs for such a project. Using the above 
example, for a 5kW project, a homeowner can receive nearly $37,000 in monetary benefits 
under the microFiT program at $0.396 per kWh. Using the example in Table 3, a 
homeowner would be benefitted by over $5,000 through the microFiT program over the 
expected 20-year purchasing contract provided by the program (refer to Appendix 1). 
Funding options for homeowners 
Ontario homeowners can obtain funding from banks in several ways. In this section 
two main types of bank loans have been examined – home improvement loans and home 
equity loans. Home improvement loans offers financing options for a home renovation or a 
home improvement project (e.g. RBC Royal Bank, 2014a).  Home equity loans combine a 
homeowner’s mortgage with a credit line under one plan2 (RBC Royal Bank, 2014b). This 
loan can be designated for different needs including home renovations, a new car or a 
child’s education. However, the homeowner must have at least 20% share of equity in their 
home.  The funding costs for this project, based on the average total upfront costs in Table 
3 is $20,281. 
Home improvement loan: The current interest rate of 5.99% for the home improvement 
loan for 5 years (the regular term offered by banks for such a project) works out to 
                                                        
2 Here the assumption is that the interest on the line of credit is the same as the mortgage interest and can be 
extended up to 20 years. 
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approximately $23,500 (RBC Royal Bank, 2014a). This would equal to a fixed monthly 
instalment of $391 per month for the entire term of the loan for 5 years. However, the 
benefit in net present value terms would be approximately $5,500 over the life of this 
project, i.e., for 20 years, with a monthly benefit of $157 obtained from the microFiT 
program. 
Home equity loan:  Alternatively, a home equity loan could be obtained. For example, BMO 
offers a 5-year fixed-term (closed) mortgage at 3.29% (BMO, 2014). While the benefit will 
remain the same under both loan types at $157 per month for 20 years, the funding 
payments will be significantly reduced to $115 per month. Thus, the homeowner would 
have a monthly benefit of $42 over the life of the project. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Cash Flows for Home Improvement and Home Equity Loans 
  
Home 
Improvement 
Loan 
Home Equity 
Loan 
Cash Flows 
  
MircoFiT Rooftop price/kWh for solar $0.396 $0.396 
Benefit under FiT/year  $1,879.28 $1,879.28 
Benefit under FiT/month $157 $157 
Benefit under FiT (cash inflows) $37,586 $37,586 
NPV of cash inflows $25,940 $25,940 
Funding payments/month $391 $115 
Funding costs (cash outflows) $23,479 $27,652 
NPV of cash outflows $20,281 $19,084 
NPV of total cash flows $5,658 $6,856 
(Refer to Appendix 1) 
Assumption: The borrowing interest rate can be renewed at the same level up to 20 years, i.e. for the 
life of the project.  
 
Most solar panels do generate energy even after 20 years albeit with a slight 
reduction in efficiency (Zielnik, 2009). This is a simple example of how an individual 
homeowner can fund a typical renewable energy project, however, alternative funding 
options, such as community-based initiatives might also be available (TREC, 2012).  
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We can see from the above example that solar projects provide a direct monetary 
benefit for its producers, even with the high associated costs. With the large number of 
semi-detached or single-detached homes in Ontario, solar projects can be installed on 
many a rooftop. Nevertheless, rooftop solar projects are not yet observed on a significant 
portion of homes in Ontario. The current installed capacity in Ontario, as of 2014, is only 
1,168MW with an additional 998MW of projects under development (OPA, 2014e). 
Although other external factors may play a role, it is hypothesized here that the 
inadequate knowledge of the actual costs and benefits and the flawed perception of its 
affordability are preventing Ontarians from adopting renewable energy technologies. 
These observations are particularly salient due to the fact that high household incomes 
exist in Ontario and have ‘flexible’ expenditure capabilities. In other words, many families 
in Ontario are, at least theoretically, in a position to install renewable energy technologies if 
proper financing and better information mechanisms are implemented. Although it must be 
acknowledged that an already large debt would certainly prevent households from taking 
on additional debt to finance their renewable energy projects.  
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Chapter Summary 
 The analysis presented in this chapter indicates that unless measures are 
implemented to change the minds of politicians, nuclear is here to stay for the long haul in 
Ontario. With the politics of renewable energy policies, the reliance on nuclear power and 
the lack of consumer awareness regarding true costs of renewable energy, transitioning to 
a green energy economy may seem challenging. However, one way to tackle the difficulty in 
transitioning to a clean energy economy is placing the power in the hands of the energy 
consumer at the grassroots level. Directly involving consumers in the production of 
renewable energy will create an environment that can foster a sustainable energy mix in 
the province by increasing the share of renewable energy. It is therefore important that 
consumers are not burdened with the high upfront costs of energy efficiency installations 
and renewable energy technologies. If Pickering Nuclear Generation Station were to be 
shut down today, the government could create a massive 2-3 GW market opportunity 
overnight for new sustainable energy solutions such as renewable energy and 
conservation. In the next chapter I will look at examples of innovative programs aimed at 
addressing the barriers to renewable energy implementation.   
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Chapter 4: Examples of financing models 
 
 Although the cost of solar photovolatics has decreased significantly, the high capital 
costs still remain the major barrier to installing renewables. The chart below shows a study 
conducted by the Institute for Building Efficiency, Johnston Controls and PACENow. The 
graph shows some of the key barriers to the installation of energy efficiency systems and 
renewable energy technologies. As can be observed, the greatest challenge is a lack of 
funding mechanisms or a high cost barrier. Although some percentage of the population 
might be willing to invest, most people are concerned about the perceived high costs of 
such investments. Moreover, to finance such projects, they would need to borrow money 
through home equity loans or rely on government funding or incentives (NREL, 2010). 
Figure 3: Barriers to installation of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies 
 
Source: Institute for Building Efficiency. (2013, February). Setting the PACE: Financing Commercial Retrofits.  
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 In this chapter, I will summarize key examples of financing models that have been 
adopted in other jurisdictions to deal with the issue of high cost barriers. Although two 
salient Canadian examples are provided, the most prominent examples hail from the United 
States, i.e., the PACE program and SolarCity.  
 
Manitoba Hydro 
 Manitoba Hydro is a Crown Corporation that provides natural gas and electricity, 
which is generated primarily through hydropower, to customers in the province of 
Manitoba (Manitoba Hydro, 2014a). They provide an Energy Finance Plan which is an on-
bill financing for electrical systems and gas upgrades, such as air source heat pumps, unit 
heaters, electric and natural gas furnaces, central A/C systems, which is specified on their 
website (Manitoba Hydro, 2014b). This financing is available to all their customers. Each 
property owner can borrow between $500 and $5,000 with a maximum financing term of 
five years at an interest rate of 6.75% (Manitoba Hydro, 2014b). Therefore, a property 
owner could pay anywhere between $9.80 (for a $500 loan) and $97.95 (for a $5,000 loan) 
per month for five years3. The Power Smart Residential Loan covers more expensive 
upgrades that are not covered in the Energy Financing Plan, such as high efficiency natural 
gas furnaces, windows, doors, insulation, and ventilation equipment (Manitoba Hydro, 
2014c). Under this loan, customers can borrow up to $7,500 for a five-year term fixed at 
4.8%, with the exception of high efficiency natural gas furnace, which is available for a 15 
year-term. To qualify for this loan only licensed contractors participating in this particular 
program can make the upgrades. This shows that the contractors have been vetted by 
                                                        
3 The payment is calculated using the loan payment calculator on the Manitoba Hydro website. 
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Manitoba Hydro and are professionally qualified to make the upgrades. However, it should 
be noted that the loan is not transferable upon sale of the property and would need to be 
paid in full (Manitoba Hydro, 2014b). The benefit of this program is that customers can not 
only borrow directly from the utility company and finance their efficiency upgrades, but 
also receive on-bill financing.  
 
British Columbia 
 Similar to Manitoba Hydro, British Columbia is testing out pilot projects for on-bill 
financing, which defer the upfront costs. The two energy efficiency pilot financing 
programs have been launched by the province of British Columbia, in a partnership with 
FortisBC and BC Hydro, in Colwood and in the South Okanagan (Province of British 
Columbia, 2014). Under the FortisBC Renovating for Efficiency Loan Program, eligible 
homeowners, in the South Okanagan region, can borrow up to $10,000 to financing energy 
efficiency projects with an interest rate of 4.5% for 10 years (FortisBC, 2014). The BC 
Hydro Home Loan Pilot Program is available to customers in the City of Colwood. This 
program also allows homeowners to borrow up to $10,000 at an interest rate of 4% 
(Province of British Columbia, 2014). The contractors that do the upgrades must be 
certified.   
 Unlike Manitoba Hydro, these programs provide the homeowners with the option of 
transferring the loan upon sale of the property to the new buyer. In January 2014, the pilot 
program, which began in 2012, has been expanded to Vancouver Island and Kelowna 
(Government of B.C., 2013).  
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Property Assessed Clean Energy Financing 
The PACE program was developed in the United States as a means to remove the 
barriers to increase residential energy efficiencies and retrofits (NREL, 2010).  It addressed 
this major issue of lack of capital by creating assessments, where the property is secured by 
a seniority of lien4 by the local government of the property. The assessment is repaid 
through the homeowner’s property tax bill without the necessity of any upfront payment 
on behalf of the homeowner. Moreover, if the homeowner defaults, the lien and the 
assessment, which are linked to the property, can be transferred on sale of the property 
(NREL, 2010).  The homeowner usually repays the assessment over a period of fifteen to 
twenty years while receiving the benefits from the installation of renewable or energy 
efficiency technologies. 
Brief History  
The early origins of the Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program can be 
traced back to Berkley, California in 2008 (Institute for Building Efficiency, 2013). The City 
of Berkley launched the Financing Initiative for Renewable and Solar Technology (FIRST) 
program, which ran a pilot program that allowed the installation of solar PVs using a new 
kind of financing system (City of Berkley, 2014).  This program allowed property owners 
the opportunity to borrow money from the Sustainable Energy Financing District of the 
City of Berkley. With $1.5 million in allocated bond funding the City would be able to 
finance up to 40 solar installations (Green Cities California, 2013). The amount was issued 
at 7.75% rate for 20 years (Fuller et al, 2009). The property owner repays the bonds 
                                                        
4 Seniority of lien is the same as a senior debt, which is borrowed money that must be paid off first by a 
company if it goes bankrupt.  
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Home Energy Renovation Opportunity (HERO): The HERO program is considered the 
most successful PACE program in the United States. It was launched in December 
2011 in cities within Riverside County in California (Clean Energy Finance Center, 
2013). It has since expanded to include over 93 communities in California. This 
program provides financing for energy efficiency, water efficiency and renewable 
energy technologies. Property owners can borrow for a period of 5, 10, 15 or 20-year 
periods up to 15% of their property value (HERO, 2014). It appears as a line item on 
the homeowner’s property tax bill through which it is repaid. In 2014, two years after 
the program began, $200 million dollars have been allocated for home energy 
improvements with $300 million more that were approved (Hales, 2014). The program 
is responsible for creating over 1,600 jobs in the region with over 1,300 registered 
contractors (SanBag, 2014).     
 
through their property tax bills over a period of 20 years. By 2009, $336,550 of the $1.5 
million funding was utilized which provided 13 installations (Green Cities California, 2013). 
 Additionally, the FIRST program was also a tool for public education and awareness. 
The staff of the FIRST program conducted three public information workshops and the City 
also involved the local community and other stakeholders to gauge the receptiveness 
towards the program (Fuller et al, 2009). The program received 77 applications within the 
two-week window for submission of applications, however, only a few applications were 
accepted because of time and budget constraints (City of Berkeley, 2014).  
Examples of the PACE program 
 In the United States, there are currently 17 PACE programs that have been 
developed (PACEnow, 2012). Below are a few examples of PACE programs that have been 
successful. 
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Figtree OnDemandPACE™: Figtree Financing is a clean energy financing company 
based in California (Figtree Financing, 2014). This program provides PACE financing for 
commercial property owners, which helps lower their utility bills through energy 
efficiency, water conservation and renewable energy technologies. The Figtree 
OnDemandPACE was launched in 2014 to reduce the cost of financing and speed up 
the funding for commercial projects (PACENow, 2014). This program provides 100% 
financing and is designed to allow projects to be structured in less than 15 days 
(NJPACE, 2014). Figtree partnered with a financial institution to receive up to $60 
million in capital to fund commercial PACE projects (PACENow, 2014).   
 
Palm Desert, California: In 2008, the City launched the Palm Desert Energy 
Independence Program (EIP), which made affordable the financing of energy 
efficiency and solar energy projects (Palm Desert, 2014). The funding for this 
project took two forms. In the first phase of the project, $2.5 million was funded 
from the city’s general fund (Fuller et al, 2009). In the second phase, $5 million in 
bonds were issued by the city’s Redevelopment Agency.  An average of $38,000 
per project was made available in funds with 206 project applications (Fuller et al, 
2009). However, most of the projects under the two phases were not residential 
projects. In 2010, the City released another $6 million in funding, however, half is 
reserved for energy efficiency upgrades and the other half for solar projects (Palm 
Desert, 2014).  
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Benefits of the PACE program 
There are several benefits to PACE program which include: 
 Providing loans at competitive interest rates as the local governments (or clean 
energy assessment districts) have good credit ratings 
 Removing the high upfront cost barrier to the installation of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy technologies or systems 
 The loans are attached to the property and not the property owner 
 Payments of the assessments are made easy through smaller and manageable 
monthly costs 
 Transferability of the investment upon sale of the property or default of the 
homeowner 
 
SolarCity 
Another great example that can be applied to Ontario would be the SolarCity model. 
SolarCity is an American company, which uses a novel approach to finance solar projects. 
They are involved in every aspect of the solar project, including financing, installations, 
permits and design, and all of this is done in-house (SolarCity, 2014). This kind of a holistic 
service is especially convenient for the homeowner. 
SolarCity installs and maintains solar panels and then leases them to the 
homeowner. The power produced by the panels is sold back to the utility company and the 
homeowner immediately sees a difference on their electricity bill. The savings from using 
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the electricity produced from the panels enables the homeowner to make the lease 
payments for the solar system.  
Financing options 
For residential purposes, SolarCity offers customers three main financing options (Solar 
City, 2014): 
1) Solar Lease – according to the company, the most popular is the “$0 down solar 
lease”. This provides several advantages for the homeowner: 
 Eliminates the high upfront cost barrier for homeowners 
 Reduction in energy bills 
 Reliable rates that are locked-in for 20 years 
 Additionally, SolarCity provides free maintenance and insurance for 20 years 
2) SolarPPA – SolarCity also offers the option of a solar Power Purchase Agreement. 
This is a contract, whereby the customer agrees to purchase solar power for a fixed 
rate, which is competitive with rates offered by the local utility. In this option, the 
homeowner only pays for the electricity they have purchased. The system, which is 
installed on the homeowner’s rooftop, is maintained and owned by SolarCity.  
3) Purchase Package – this option is mainly for homeowners that can afford to 
purchase a solar system. Here, the homeowner can obtain a 30% or more credit on 
their tax returns, which are federal-level and state-level solar tax rebates. The 
payback period on this investment is between six and eight years. Moreover, 
SolarCity offers a 30-year protection plan for the solar system, which involves 
repairs and insurance. 
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The steps
 
Firstly, SolarCity sends in their consultants to assess the home, the roof and energy 
use to determine the benefits of solar installations for the particular property. If the 
consultants determine that the home will benefit from the solar installations, SolarCity 
provides the homeowner with several project options to increase energy savings. Next, a 
20-year contract is signed with fixed interest rates. ‘Site Surveyors’ are then sent in to take 
measurements and to conduct a roof inspection. Once this is done, a solar system is 
designed specifically to suit the needs of the home. Finally, the installations are completed 
in a single day and SolarCity takes care of all the necessary permits and inspections. The 
utility company gives the final approval.  
 
It is important to note that SolarCity has received financing from the Bank of 
America, Merrill Lynch and Google, as well as a 30% federal tax credit for solar installations 
(EY, 2013). These tax credits came into effect in 2005 and in 2017 it will be reduced to 10% 
(EY, 2013). This will likely present some challenges for the company in the future.  
 
  
Home is 
assessed 
by 
SolarCity 
 
A 20-year 
fixed-rate 
contract is 
signed 
 
 
A solar 
system is 
designed 
to suit the 
needs of 
the home 
 
 
Solar 
installation 
is made 
 
The utility 
company 
gives the 
final 
approval  
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Nevertheless, SolarCity has gained huge success in the US market. In 2012, SolarCity 
had installed 156MW of solar PV systems across the United States (Krulewitz, 2013). A 
Greentech media study shows that SolarCity is the leading installer within the residential 
markets of California and Arizona and ranks number one in other states as well (Krulewitz, 
2013).  
 
Figure 4: Residential Market Size and SolarCity Market Share 
 
Source:  Krulewitz, A. (2013, March 18). The Numbers Behind SolarCity’s Success: Greenteach Media. 
Greentech Media. Retrieved July 27, 2014 from http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-
Numbers-Behind-SolarCitys-Success. 
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Chapter Summary 
 The examples in this chapter show that such program models can fund several 
different kinds of energy projects (energy efficiency and renewable technologies) and 
obtain financing through different means (bonds, reserve funds, etc.). More importantly, 
the high application rates prove that these models, specifically the PACE program and 
SolarCity, have been successful in the jurisdictions in which they have been implemented. 
Furthermore, there are numerous benefits to the adoption of a similar kind of program, the 
most important being the availability of financing for projects with high capital costs which 
prevents homeowners from increasing energy efficiencies and installing renewable 
technologies.  
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Chapter 5: A model for Ontario 
 
 In the previous chapters, I have highlighted that one of the main barriers to the 
adoption of renewable technologies, specifically solar photovoltaics, is the perception of 
the high capital costs related to these technologies and the limited knowledge about the 
financial benefits related to the microFiT program.  
 Unlike the case in the United States where the program model is adopted by the city 
or county, and the payments are included as an additional charge to the property taxes, I 
am recommending that the local energy distribution companies (LDCs) in Ontario adopt 
this model, since many LDCs already handle the distribution of energy and FiT applications. 
Also, as stated in the conclusions of Chapter 3, placing the power in the hands of the energy 
consumer will create a grassroots awareness of the benefits of renewable energy that can 
promote a sustainable energy mix in Ontario.  
 In this section, a model that encourages the LDCs in Ontario to adopt a financing 
model similar to SolarCity and the PACE program, which has been successful in the United 
States, is proposed. In this model, the homeowner becomes a “prosumer”, i.e., a producer 
and consumer of energy. Although different kinds of renewable technologies and energy 
efficiency systems can also be applied under this model, I will only focus on solar 
photovoltaics (PVs) due to the limitations of this paper.  
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The following is an overview of the proposed model: 
 
 
The following sections will go into more details about the specifics of this proposed 
program. 
  
5. Prosumer receives on-bill financing and benfits of the solar installation 
4. Post-installation audit and connection to the grid 
3. Local distribution company installs the system in the home  
 (Here the homeowner receives an audit report of potential energy efficiency and renewable energy 
installations and chooses an installation package) 
2. Eco-audit of the home by local distribution company 
1. Local distribution company raises funds for the project 
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1. The Local Distribution Company (LDC) funds the project  
 The LDC would need to raise capital to finance this initiative. Since most Ontario’s 
LDCs usually have good credit ratings, they would be able to borrow or raise debt capital at 
significantly lower rates than homeowners and other small businesses. For example, 
Toronto Hydro in 2012 had a credit rating of ‘A (high)’ according to DBRS and ‘A’ according 
to S&P (Toronto Hydro Corporation, 2012a; Spears, 2012). Similarly, Hydro One also has a 
credit rating of A (Hydro One, 2013b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why should the LDCs adopt this model? 
 
In Ontario the distribution of electricity, from high-voltage to low-
voltage transmission systems, to homeowners and other institutions is 
the responsibility of LDCs (OPA, 2014a). There are nearly 80 of 
these LDCs, which can be publicly or privately owned, but are 
mostly owned by local municipalities. The Ontario Energy Board 
regulates the electricity rates that these companies charge the 
consumers. 
Moreover, these LDCs also maintain the local electricity wires and 
also create energy conservation programs. Additionally, they are also 
responsible for approving the connection of renewable energy 
projects under the FiT and microFiT programs (OPA, 2014a). 
Therefore, it would be fitting for the LDCs to introduce a program 
whereby homeowners or small business owners are able to finance 
their efficiency and renewable energy projects through the energy 
company.  
The benefits for LDCs of having energy consumers become 
prosumers are numerous. These include less need for investment on 
distribution, less centralized assets and less transmissions losses, 
while obtaining new market and business opportunities.  
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Funding can be raised in the following ways:  
Debt: Ontario LDCs could be encouraged by the province to issue debt, such as bonds, like 
the energy districts in the US examples at a lower coupon or yield due to their higher credit 
rating. Moreover, the debt offering can be marketed to investors as a ‘socially responsible 
investment’. An investment is considered socially responsible when the associated 
company adopts environmental sustainability and alternative energy or clean technology 
initiatives (Investopedia, 2014). Many ethical and pension funds are likely to invest in such 
an offering as it can be considered a socially responsible investment and has been gaining 
momentum over the past few years. For example, the Canadian Pension Plan and 
Investment Board states on its website that they consider and integrate Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) risks and opportunities into their investment decisions 
(Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, 2014). Moreover, they believe that such 
responsible investing will most likely create a long-term sustainable value for an 
organization.  
 The LDC could also issue callable bonds that they can redeem or pay back prior to 
the maturity of the bond. This enables the issuer to repay the debt and enter into a new 
refinancing arrangement, if interest rates fall.  
 An example of debt, are the bonds issued by Toronto Hydro in April 2013. Toronto 
Hydro sold C$250 million of 2.91 percent series 8 senior debentures due April 10, 2023 
(10-year bonds) and also sold C$200 million of 3.96 percent series 9 senior debentures due 
April 9, 2063 (50-year bonds) (Reuters, 2013).  Since the typical microFiT program is for 
20 years, I have used a linear interpolation formula to calculate the rate at which the 
energy company can issue its bond offering or debt securities with a maturity of 20 years. 
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 On interpolating the data obtained from the debts issued by Toronto Hydro in 2013, 
the LDC can potentially finance the project by issuing debt securities at 3.165%. However, 
legal and administrative costs to mobilize the debt offering would also apply, and hence I 
have arrived at an all-inclusive rate of 3.99% for 20 years at which the energy company can 
lend to the homeowners. This rate is still 2% below than the 5.99% rate for a 5-year loan 
that an individual homeowner would normally be able to access in the open market.  
Loans:  The energy company could also borrow from a lending institution. Again, since the 
LDCs have a better credit rating, they can obtain loans at lower rates and at more 
favourable terms than individual homeowners and small businesses. I have considered this 
rate to be the same as the debt offering, i.e., 3.99% per annum, for 20 years. 
Linear Interpolation Formula (ISDA, 2010): 
 
d = d1 +   g – g1 * (d2 – d1) 
g2 – g1 
 
d = rate for 20 years 
d1 = 2.91% 
d2 = 3.96% 
g = 20  
g1 = 10 
g2 = 50 
 
d = 0.029 + 20 – 10 * (0.0396 – 0.0291) 
                              50 – 10 
 
= 0.03165 or 3.165% 
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Green Bonds: The province could also issue green bonds5. The tax-exempt status of green 
bonds makes them attractive to investors. For example, the state of Massachusetts 
successfully sold $100 million fixed-rate, tax-exempt Green Bonds to investors, which are 
used to fund environmental and energy projects (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2013).  
The bonds yielded between 3.25% and 3.85% for 20-year bonds (Collier, 2014). As Ontario 
will be issuing Green Bonds (Gutscher, 2014), the province can earmark part of these funds 
towards funding LDCs for renewable energy projects.  
Zero-interest finance: In 2010, the Better Buildings Partnership (BBP) offered zero-
interest financing for private multi-residential rental buildings as well as institutional and 
not-for-profit organizations (City of Toronto, 2010). These loans were offered through the 
City’s Sustainable Energy Funds (SEF) program. SEF used a pay-from-savings model, where 
the savings from the FiT program paid back the upfront capital costs of the project, which 
enabled them to offer zero-interest financing. Similarly, municipalities can tap into 
resources, such as the Green Municipal Fund6 and other SEFs, which can be used in tandem 
with the LDCs to establish a zero-interest loan program to fund renewable energy projects.  
The funding risk of the zero-interest lending program can be underwritten by the province 
with part of the savings on the operating costs from an early 2014 shut down of the 
Pickering Nuclear Generating Station. Thus, even if the municipalities cannot help finance 
these zero-interest loans, the LDCs can still issue zero-interest loans with the backing of the 
province.  
                                                        
5 Green bonds are created to encourage investments in sustainable projects, such as renewable energy 
projects. 
6 Green Municipal Fund (GMF) is offered by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities to fund municipal 
environmental initiatives. The GMF funds projects  (with below-market loans and grants), feasibility studies 
and plans (FCM, 2014). 
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 Since this is a new initiative and the demand for this kind of model is yet to be 
determined by the LDCs in Ontario, the loan option might be a better interim solution. The 
LDC could have a temporary lending arrangement or use a flexible financing tool with a 
financial institution, such as a revolving loan facility or revolving credit. This means that 
the lending institution gives the borrower the flexibility to decide the number of times and 
intervals they choose to withdraw from the loan (Investopedia, 2014). Furthermore, this 
type of loan can be re-drawn, repaid or drawn-down. However, this is usually a short-term 
loan (Investopedia, 2014).  
 Using this type of financing tool, the LDC could enter into a credit arrangement with 
its financial institution to borrow up to $2,000,000 (which would fund an average of 100 
homes7) or a monetary cap they foresee, and then monitor the demand for a year. This type 
of loan would allow the LDC to use as much money as they need, within the authorized 
limit, to finance the projects. They could also have a trial period of six months to a year to 
determine the demand for the program initiative and depending on the success of the 
program they could then consider issuing debt. Additionally, the local distribution 
company could also explore other options such as conducting a feasibility study or a pilot 
project for a few homes to better understand the demand-response. 
 
  
                                                        
7 $2,000,000/$20,000 = 100 
$2,000,000 = amount borrowed 
$20,000 = the amount that is needed to finance project is ~ $20,000 (See Appendix 1) 
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2. Home energy audits 
 To assess the feasibility of the installing energy efficiency or solar photovoltaic 
systems, a home energy audit would need to be conducted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EcoEnergy Program 
 
The ecoENERGY Retrofit program, which ran from April 2007 to March 2012, was an 
initiative by the department of Natural Resources Canada (Natural Resources Canada, 
2012).  Under this program homeowners were able to have home energy audits done to 
become eligible for energy efficiency upgrades.  The program began with an initial 
budget of $160 million, which increased to $745 million due to its popularity (McKie, 
2013). Moreover, it was estimated that by 2010 nearly 640,000 Canadians saved an 
average of 20 percent on their energy bills because of efficiencies made under the 
ecoENERGY Retrofit program (McKie, 2013; Government of Canada, 2012). 
In order to qualify for the rebates, property owners would need to follow these steps 
(Natural Resources Canada, 2012): 
 Owners would need to register their property and receive a registration number.  
 The homeowner would then need to hire a local service organization that is 
licensed by Natural Resources Canada. The organization would then send in a 
certified energy advisor who would perform a pre-retrofit evaluation and 
provide the homeowner with a report with an EnerGuide rating label. 
 Then the homeowner would choose the eligible energy efficiency upgrades and 
install them. 
 Lastly, the homeowner would again contact the local service organization to 
conduct a post-retrofit evaluation and sign a grant application. 
This process allowed homeowners to make eligible energy efficiency upgrades that 
included heating and cooling systems, ventilation systems, domestic hot water 
equipment, insulation, air sealing, windows/doors and water conservation (Natural 
Resources Canada, 2012). Homeowners were able to receive up to $5,000 in 
government rebates.   
In the ecoEnergy program, energy auditors would charge a minimum fee of $200 plus 
tax that included a government rebate of $150 and an additional $195 plus tax for 
follow up energy audits (Home Performance, 2011. The follow up energy audits would 
include an updated EnerGuide rating that reflects on the improvements made and also 
the application for the $5,000 government grant. Similarly, for the proposed program, 
energy companies could charge a fixed fee for home energy audits. Even Windfall 
Solar, part of Windfall Ecology Center, which is a non-profit environmental 
organization and social enterprise in Aurora, Ontario, charges a $150 assessment fee to 
install solar photovoltaic systems (Windfall Centre, 2014). This assessment cost is then 
fully refunded when the customer purchases a solar system from them. 
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Using the example of the ecoEnergy program by Natural Resources Canada, the LDC 
would conduct an energy audit.  
In the proposed program, the auditors would be trained and certified professionals 
working for the LDC. This would ensure that homeowners can be assured that only 
qualified personnel or contractors will be involved in the installations or upgrades to the 
home. The auditor would then provide the homeowner with a report containing the low-
hanging fruits of energy efficiency and could also suggest renewable installations, such as 
solar photovoltaics, if the appropriate conditions allow for it. This assessment would 
qualify as a feasibility assessment of the property for any solar installations, which are 
already required by the local distribution companies (Enersource, 2014). Moreover, the 
energy audits would also provide the homeowner with a cost-benefit analysis of choosing 
certain energy efficiency or renewable energy installations over others. The local energy 
company could charge a similar rate to the ecoENERGY program between $150 and $200 
for this type of assessment. If the homeowner chooses to install solar photovoltaics, the 
local energy distribution company could refund a portion or all of the fees.  
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3. Installation of the systems 
 To install the solar panels, the LDC would need to either employ qualified 
technicians or outsource the installation aspect of this project. In Table 4 (also Appendix 1), 
the cost of labour represents a 15% discount due to economies of scale or an outsourcing 
benefit. Normally, for a 5kW solar project, the labour costs would include approximately 
two working days with three installers at the rate of $75 an hour, which would total 
approximately $3,000.   
 Furthermore, if LDCs employ technicians or installers, they would be able to train 
and certify them under the Canadian Standards Association (CSA).  
 
 
 
 
 
By obtaining certification of their contractors, the LDCs would be the more 
trustworthy option for homeowners. Certifications and standards within this industry 
would not only ensure consistency in installations but also create greater efficiencies. 
Moreover, it would contribute to creating more green jobs in the province and further 
establish the importance and role of renewable energy in Ontario. 
The CSA group is a non-profit organization that develops and 
delivers standards and codes, provides trainings and personnel 
certification programs (CSA Group, 2014). Among other 
certifications, the CSA offers the Construction Electrician (NOC 
7241) – Solar Photovoltaic Systems personnel certification. This 
certifies the knowledge and the competencies of individuals to use 
proper techniques to plan, implement, install and maintain solar 
photovoltaic systems (CSA Group, 2012). 
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4. Post-Installations 
 Once the installations of the solar PVs have been made, the auditors would then 
come back for a second audit.  During the second audit, the company would conduct the 
Connection Impact Assessment, which requires all LDCs to assess the generation facilities 
before connecting it to the grid (Enersource, 2014). The assessment would need to be 
conducted by a professional engineer as the plan and drawings must be submitted to the 
Electrical Safety Authority for approval (Enersource, 2014). These assessments cost about 
$2,500 with an additional $500 for the FiT application to the OPA (OPA, 2014b; Toronto 
Hydro, 2012b). The LDC can help the homeowner in the application process in order to 
obtain the benefits under the FiT program.  
Furthermore, if the homeowner decides to sell this property, the loan and billings 
for the solar photovoltaic panels can be transferred to the buyer of the property for the 
remainder of the term of the contract. 
 
   
5. On-bill financing  
 The on-bill financing makes it easier for the homeowner. The payments will appear 
as an additional line item on the customer’s bill and will be netted off with the benefits 
received under the FiT program. The homeowner will pay off the costs for the solar 
installations for a fixed amount for 20 years while also receiving the benefits under the FiT 
program.    
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Understanding the costs and benefits under this model 
To understand the financing benefits under the proposed program, the same 
examples and data from Table 3 in Chapter 3 are used. However, an additional column has 
been added to show a comparison for the numbers, including costs and benefits, under the 
LDC model (shaded in green) in Table 4. 
The total upfront costs under the proposed model would be approximately $17,800, 
which represents a discount of about 12.5% off the average upfront costs for the three 
examples mentioned earlier. While the potential benefits under the FiT program remain 
the same, the loan payments under the energy company are spread over 20 years8 at a 
relatively lower instalment of $107 per month. In summary, using the LDC model, the 
homeowner would be benefitted by over $8,000 over the expected 20-year life of the 
program, an increase in benefit of approximately $2,500 over the home improvement loan 
and approximately $1,000 over the home equity loan. 
 
Each section on the table has been discussed in more detail below: 
Total upfront costs:  
For a 5kW solar photovoltaic system, the costs of the three different panel manufactures 
have been added. Therefore, an average cost of a 5kW system with 19 panels has been 
calculated as $4,906. The cost of panels, racking system and inverter, other miscellaneous 
costs and labour have been discounted by 15%.  
This is primarily because LDCs are quite large and under this program they would be able 
to achieve economies of scale by sourcing materials directly from the manufacturer at bulk 
                                                        
8 The energy company could also provide different options for customers who would wish to repay the 
amounts within a shorter timeframe, e.g., 5, 10 or 20 years 
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prices, thus avoiding any intermediaries. Further, they could either employ full-time 
workers as opposed to contract workers or outsource the labour component at a lower rate 
than existing installation companies. This could result in savings on the costs for panels, 
other materials and labour. Other administrative efficiencies would also likely occur 
through this kind of a model. The costs associated with the application fee to the LDC 
(which includes the Connection Impact Assessment) and the application fees to the Ontario 
Power Authority (OPA) have not been discounted and included at the same price. However, 
the LDC would have to bear the costs of the initial energy audit if the homeowner decides 
to proceed with the installation of the complete system. The total upfront costs including 
the Harmonized Sales Tax would amount to $17,748, which is a direct savings of at least 
$2,500 compared to the individual homeowner installation examples we have seen.  
Energy Generation: 
 The figures under this section mostly remain unchanged. The average sunlight in 
Toronto will remain 1025 hours per year. The figure for the average generation of the 
system under the local distribution company is 4,732 kWh/year, the same as the average of 
the three examples.  
Cash Flows:  
 The benefit received under the FiT program is $157 per month, which is an average 
of the benefits that can be obtained from the other three panels (Eclipsall, Siliken and 
Heliene) under both the home improvement and home equity loans. Therefore, the gross 
benefit a homeowner would receive would be over $37,000 over 20 years. However, using 
net present value, the benefit under the FiT program would be around $26,000.  
  
 59 
Table 4 – Costs of installing solar photovoltaics with debt financing from the LDC 
  
Home 
Improvement 
Loan 
Home 
Equity 
Loan 
Local 
Distribution 
Company 
Specifications 
 
 
 
Approx. size (kW) 5 5 
 
Approx. size (W) 5000 5000 
 
Actual size of system (kW) 4.92 4.92 
 
Cost per panel $255 $255 
 
Wattage of module (W) 255.00 255.00 
 
Number of panels required 19.67 19.67 
 
Actual number of panels required 19.33 19.33 
 
Costs 
 
 
 
Panels $4,906 $4,906 $4,170 
Racking System $2,815 $2,815 $2,393 
Inverter $2,927 $2,927 $2,488 
Miscellaneous $1,000 $1,000 $850 
Labour $3,300 $3,300 $2,805 
Application fee – OPA $500 $500 $500 
Application fee - Local energy company $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 
HST $2,333 $2,333 $2,042 
Total upfront costs $20,281 $20,281 $17,748 
Energy Generation 
 
 
 
Avg. sunlight in Toronto/year (hours) 1025 1025 
 
Optimal generation of system 
(kWh/year) 
5040 5040 
 
Average generation (kWh/year) 4746 4746 4746 
Cash Flows 
 
 
 
MircoFiT Rooftop price/kWh for solar $0.396 $0.396 $0.396 
Benefit under FiT/year  $1,879.28 $1,879.28 $1,879.28 
Benefit under FiT/month $157 $157 $157 
Benefit under FiT (cash inflows) $37,586 $37,586 $37,586 
NPV of cash inflows $25,940 $25,940 $25,940 
Funding payments/month $391 $115 $107 
Funding costs (cash outflows) $23,479 $27,652 $25,716 
NPV of cash outflows $20,281 $19,084 $17,748 
NPV of total cash flows $5,658 $6,856 $8,192 
(Refer to Appendix 1 for a detailed breakdown of the calculations, assumptions and references) 
 
 60 
The monthly payment under the home improvement loan is $391 for 5 years, but 
the payment under the home equity loan is much lower at $115 spread over 20 years. 
Under the LDC model, the homeowner would need to pay $107 per month for 20 years. 
This is marginally lower than the home equity loan due to the cost efficiencies obtained by 
the LDCs on the total upfront costs. This would amount to nearly $26,000 for the life of the 
project and a net present value of a little below $18,000. The net benefit of the project in 
present value terms would be a little over $8,000. This gives the homeowner a direct 
monetary benefit if they install the system through the LDC rather than undertaking the 
project independently. 
Impact 
 While the LDC model is favourable to the prosumer, it must be noted that 
LDCs may lose local electricity sales if distributed generation by prosumers catches on. This 
means that there would be a decreased amount of electricity sold by the LDCs as a result of 
this model, which in turn would reduce their revenues, but not decrease their expenses of 
maintaining and building their systems (Spears, 2014d). To compensate the LDCs for their 
losses, the province must reward them for their conservation and renewable energy 
projects. Although developing policy suggestions for an LDC compensation model is beyond 
the limitations of this paper, they are recognized as an important area of research that 
merits further examination.  
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Advantages 
The proposed model provides several benefits to both the homeowner or ‘prosumer’ and 
the LDC. 
 
Homeowner or ‘prosumers’:  
 Credit to finance project can be more easily accessed by more homeowners 
 The current low interest rates can help the energy companies issue debt or borrow 
at a competitive low interest rates that can be passed on to the homeowner.9  
 Security for homeowners that only qualified people certified by the LDC will do 
installations in their homes. 
 While an individual homeowner with good credit can normally borrow at 5.99% for 
a period of 5 years under a green loan program, an LDC can issue debt or even 
borrow for a longer term at a lower rate and pass this benefit to the homeowner. 
For example, on October of 2013, Hydro One issued a 30-year debt at 4.59% (Hydro 
One, 2013b).  
 The loan and billing for the solar photovoltaic panels can be transferred to the buyer 
of the property (new homeowner) for the remainder of the term of the contract, 
unlike other loans. 
 Zero-interest financing can be provided by the LDC to attract homeowners who 
cannot access home equity loans. 
 The term of the loan from the energy company is spread over 20 years, unlike the 
current bank loan for 5 years maximum, which puts a much lesser burden on the 
monthly instalment amount payable.  
 Fewer problems coordinating with various agencies for separate items as this model 
is a one-stop shop where the LDC facilitates and coordinates all activities. 
 No upfront costs for the homeowner like labour, materials, application fees, etc., as 
the LDC bears all the initial costs. 
 This model would be made simpler by relying on an on-bill financing for the 
homeowner. The cost would just be an additional line item on their utility bill, 
unlike a loan where the homeowner has to take care of all the bills separately from 
the various service providers.  
 Better service, installation and on-going support because installers/support 
technicians are trained and certified by LDCs. 
 The creation of new jobs and the further development of a sustainable economy in 
Ontario. 
                                                        
9 The Bank of Canada has maintained its Target Overnight rate, the benchmark on which many borrowing and 
lending rates for consumers are based, at 1% since September 2010 in its key rates announcement on March 
5, 2014 (Bank of Canada, 2014). Thus, the low interest rate regime is expected to stay for a while and debt can 
continue to be raised at correspondingly low interest rates. 
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Local Distribution Company: 
 New business opportunities and growth in revenues 
 Repayment is assured through the secure 20-year payments under the FiT contracts 
as the FiT benefit for energy produced would be potentially greater than or equal to 
the cost of energy consumed, resulting in fewer accounts that can default on their 
payments. 
 Lower transmission costs due to less need for transmission from high-voltage 
systems. Since the electricity is generated within the local distribution system, the 
LDC does not need to obtain electricity from the high-voltage transmission system. 
The LDC would also include some grid management fees in the pricing to manage 
distribution and volumes on the local grid.  
 Less need for transmission and distribution and centralized generation 
infrastructure. 
 The homeowner will be charged by the LDC for energy delivery to (produced by the 
solar panels) and from (regular electricity usage) the grid. This will add to the 
revenue of the LDC as the delivery costs will be factored into the pricing. There 
would be a greater cost-benefit for LDCs as demand increases. More jobs and a 
bigger manufacturing sector would potentially generate efficiencies in technology 
and cost reductions for solar photovoltaics, thereby, making the model even more 
attractive to homeowners, resulting in increased sales. 
 Additionally, the province may also consider introducing a tax-credit or benefit to 
the LDC based on the energy conserved, i.e., managing energy within the local grid, 
and savings obtained from non-transmission from the high-voltage systems. The 
benefit could be provided from the potential savings generated from the Pickering 
nuclear power plant early phase-out or the green bonds currently being issued.   
 
What would it look like without the FiT program? 
 We have considered the benefits of implementing a program in Ontario similar to 
the PACE financing and SolarCity programs. However, due to the limitations placed on 
renewable energy in Ontario, there may come a time in the near future where the FiT 
program might be eliminated entirely. Below I briefly discuss how this model can work 
independently of the FiT program. 
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 The average household in in Ontario consumes about 9,600 kWh of electricity per 
year, which is equal to 800 kWh per month (Ontario Ministry of Energy, 2014). The 
electricity costs per kW including delivery is approximately $0.1710. This gives an annual 
cost of $1,668 or $139 per month billed to the homeowner.  
 Now, if a homeowner decides to install a solar system under the financing model of 
the LDC, they would require $25,716 in funding costs for 20 years. These are the same 
funding costs that can be observed in green highlighted section on Table 4. This would be 
an additional charge of $107 per month for 20 years. If the 5kW project generates an 
average of 4,746 kWh per year, the cost of this electricity that is generated would equal to 
$825 per year or $69 per month. This is a potential savings on the homeowner’s monthly 
energy bill. Therefore, the net payment for the solar system would be $40 per month. This 
means that the solar system pays off approximately 63 percent of the cost just through 
savings in electricity. Another interesting fact in this example is that the homeowner would 
be generating nearly 50 percent of their energy needs through this photovoltaic system. 
 
Table 5: Cash flow without the Feed-in-Tariff program 
 Cash flow per 
month 
NPV of total cash 
flow 
% 
Funding payments ($107) ($17,748) 100% 
Savings $69 $11,381 64% 
Net payments ($39) ($6,366) 36% 
NPV = Net Present Value 
 
                                                        
10 This figure is based on home electricity bill for June 2014. The total electricity bill (including delivery 
charges) was $128.37 and kW usage was 778. 128.37/778 = $0.165 ~ 0.17 
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 We can see that although this project would provide a good amount of energy for a 
home and it does provide some savings, the project is still expensive. Moreover, this project 
does not consider energy storage, which will be a necessity if the system is to provide 
energy security or smart grid services.  
 At this point in time, this model project is unlikely to work independent of the 
benefits the Ontario government provides under the FiT program. If the program must run 
without government incentives, the costs of installing solar photovoltaic systems need to 
decrease significantly or an increase in the efficiency of the panels themselves is needed. 
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Concluding remarks 
Ontario’s energy history shows how energy production in the province, which 
started out with hydroelectricity, gradually evolved to include various different forms of 
energy, such as coal, nuclear, gas and now new renewable energy technologies. During the 
1990s there was a major restructuring process of Ontario’s electricity sector, primarily the 
deregulation of province’s electricity system and the privatization and subsequent split up 
of Ontario Hydro. With the Liberal’s assuming power in 2003, the province’s energy 
landscape changed again dramatically. Dalton McGuinty’s government not only banned and 
phased out coal production in Ontario but also placed greater emphasis on renewable 
energy through the enactment of the Green Energy and Green Economy of 2009 and the 
Feed-in-Tariff program. This transformation of the electricity sector indicates that Ontario 
can make another shift to increase the use of renewable energy. Moreover, the Long Term 
Energy Plan of 2013 shows a decreasing of the province’s dependency on nuclear energy 
and an increasing of renewable energy sources and energy conservation measures.  
Nevertheless, for renewable energy sources to achieve greater market penetration 
and an increased share in Ontario’s energy mix, it is important to understand the barriers 
to its widespread implementation, which need to be addressed through effective planning 
and policy-making. Although there are several barriers to renewables, this paper examined 
a few of the most relevant barriers to Ontario in relation to residential adoption of solar 
photovoltaics. Additional barriers that still require further research include political issues, 
such as the rising energy prices that are blamed on renewable energy incentives, the halt 
on offshore wind development as a purely political move and the WTO ruling due to 
competing interests from other jurisdictions.  Another major barrier that merits further 
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research is whether the continued dominance of nuclear power in Ontario should remain. 
Although nuclear power development in Ontario is infamous for cost overruns and its 
production is inflexible, thus far nuclear energy still plays a prominent role in Ontario due 
to the much powerful and vigorous campaigning of nuclear lobbies. Consumer affordability 
of renewable technologies is a key barrier considered in this paper. Key statistics and 
models were examined, such as household expenditure, income and debt, along with the 
cost of solar photovoltaics installations.  While it can be observed that many Ontario 
homeowners can afford the installations, there are not yet a significant number of homes 
with solar photovoltaics in Ontario. This reality indicates that high installation costs are a 
perceived barrier for solar photovoltaic installations. Nevertheless, to remove this negative 
perception, innovative financing models need to be put in place to ensure that consumers 
are not burdened with greater debt. 
To develop a model that would work for Ontarians, I have reviewed financing 
models in other jurisdictions. In Canada, Manitoba Hydro and a pilot program in British 
Columbia provide their customers with loans for energy efficiency upgrades, albeit with 
high interest rates, through on-bill financing. The United States has the PACE program by 
which a homeowner can install renewable or energy efficiency technologies without the 
need for any upfront payment, as the assessment is paid through the homeowner’s 
property tax bill over a period of 15 to 20 years. SolarCity, also in the United States, has 
created an innovative model for customers, whereby, they not only finance the renewable 
energy projects through a solar lease, but also install, design and look after permits for 
these projects, providing the customer with a holistic service.  
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Although many Ontarians are interested in renewable energy technologies, public 
investment is not as high. To move Ontario towards a green energy economy, energy needs 
to be placed in the hands of the Ontario public so that they are not only able to witness the 
benefits first-hand, but are also part of the movement. Using the examples of financing 
models in different jurisdictions, I have proposed a model for Ontario that addresses local 
needs. In this model, Ontario LDCs can become is a one-stop-shop for the consumer.  LDCs 
are well positioned to provide on-bill financing for their customers who qualify for solar 
photovoltaic installations and help conduct home energy audits, system installations and 
connections to the grid. I have examined the different ways through which the LDC can 
finance this model, such as through debt issue or loan. The LDCs can also look at obtaining 
funding from their local municipality’s sustainable energy funds or through the Green 
Municipal Fund. The province can also aid LDCs with funding from the green bonds they 
will be issuing this year. Moreover, my model also advocates the growth and development 
of the green energy economy by growing the manufacturing sector of solar photovoltaics 
and by increasing employment through the training and certification of solar photovoltaic 
installers. This model illustrates how LDCs can play a major role to facilitate the shift to 
renewable energy and help lower the barriers for homeowners. By providing no upfront 
costs, low to zero per cent interest, on-bill financing and free maintenance, LDCs can not 
only provide direct monetary benefits to homeowners but can also provide them with 
peace of mind and security as LDCs are well-established local public companies. 
Furthermore, renewable energy contracts under this new model can be transferred to new 
homeowners upon sale of the property. In turn, LDCs benefit from lower transmission 
losses and less need for investment on distribution. Similar to SolarCity in the U.S., LDCs 
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have the potential to enter into an untapped market in Ontario and become local leaders in 
providing this form of a holistic renewable energy service.  
 
Future Policy Recommendations: 
To make the model operational, a few policy decisions would need to be concurrently 
addressed by the province. 
 The phasing out of expensive nuclear facilities for precautionary and security 
reasons and for increasing the share of the renewable energy market. The costs of 
refurbishing and maintaining aging nuclear facilities, and the availability of 
additional capacity for more cleaner forms of energy production, i.e., renewable 
energy, should be given due consideration by the provincial government.  
 The feasibility of shutting down the Pickering nuclear plant in 2014 that would 
result in savings of approximately $850 million per year for its remaining life and 
using the savings to underwrite zero-interest financing for the LDCs needs to be 
closely considered.  
 Encouraging decentralized energy production to reduce overall transmission costs 
and reliance on high-voltage transmission. 
 If such a distributed generation model is implemented, the LDCs would need to be 
compensated for the loss of local electricity sales through a new policy statement 
that provides a benefit program for their conservation efforts.    
 Enhancing the green bonds program with more options, to include funding for LDCs 
to finance their renewable energy projects.  
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 Continuing the feed-in-tariff program until an optimal energy mix is reached or until 
the technology becomes cost efficient and storage technology becomes affordable. 
 
While this model is conceptual in nature, further research needs to be conducted in 
some areas. This paper only examined solar photovoltaic technology in isolation, hence, 
further research needs to be conducted on how other energy efficiency installations can 
contribute to cost savings, for both the LDC and the homeowner under this model. It is also 
important to understand if the LDCs in Ontario have an appetite to actually evolve into this 
kind of a one-stop-shop for homeowners that wish to install renewable energy and energy 
efficiency technologies. Since the LDCs will lose on their local electricity sales, further 
research needs to be undertaken to determine and develop appropriate compensation for 
their conservation efforts and renewable energy projects. The scope of my research does 
not consider these costs, but simply recommends a tax credit or benefit from the cash 
saved on the early phasing out of the Pickering nuclear plants. Lastly, more research needs 
to be conducted on whether investors are willing to invest in zero-coupon or low-interest 
green bonds issued by the LDC or the province and the dollar amount that be potentially 
raised from this issue. A pilot project should be conducted to ensure that this kind of 
financing can be indeed successful. 
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Appendix 1 – Cost comparison of solar systems  
  Eclipsall Siliken Heliene H. I. Loan* H.E. Loan** LDC 
Specifications          
Approx. size (kW) 5 5 5 5 5  
Approx. size (W)1 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000  
Actual size of system (kW)4 4.90 4.90 4.95 4.92 4.92  
Cost per panel2 $239.99(a)  $245.00(b)  $278.82(c)  $255 $255  
Wattage of module (W) 245 245 275 255.00 255.00  
Number of panels required3 20.41 20.41 18.18 19.67 19.67  
Actual number of panels required 20 20 18 19.33 19.33  
Costs          
Panels5 $4,800  $4,900  $5,019  $4,906 $4,906 $4,170 
Racking System6 $2,815  $2,815  $2,815  $2,815 $2,815 $2,393 
Inverter6 $2,927  $2,927  $2,927  $2,927 $2,927 $2,488 
Miscellaneous7 $1,000(a)   $1,000(a)   $1,000(a)   $1,000 $1,000 $850 
Labour7 $3,375(a)   $3,375(a)   $3,150(b)   $3,300 $3,300 $2,805 
Application fee – OPA8 $500  $500  $500  $500 $500 $500 
Application fee - Local energy company9 $2,500  $2,500  $2,500  $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 
HST10 $2,329  $2,342  $2,328  $2,333 $2,333 $2,042 
Total upfront costs11 $20,246  $20,359  $20,239  $20,281 $20,281 $17,748 
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 Eclipsall Siliken Heliene H. I. Loan* H.E. Loan** LDC 
Energy Generation          
Avg. sunlight in Toronto/year (hours)12 1025 1025 1025 1025 1025  
Optimal generation of system 
(kWh/year)13 5023 5023 5074 
5040 5040  
Average generation (kWh/year)14 4730(a) 4730(a) 4778(b) 4746 4746 4746 
Cash Flows          
MircoFiT Rooftop price/kWh for solar15 $0.396 $0.396 $0.396 $0.396 $0.396 $0.396 
Benefit under FiT/year16  $1,872.91 $1,872.91 $1,892.02 $1,879.28 $1,879.28 $1,879.28 
Benefit under FiT/month17 $156 $156 $158 $157 $157 $157 
Benefit under FiT (cash inflows)18 $37,458 $37,458 $37,840 $37,586 $37,586 $37,586 
NPV of cash inflows19 $25,852 $25,852 $26,116 $25,940 $25,940 $25,940 
Funding payments/month20 $391 $393 $390 $391 $115(a) $107(b) 
Funding costs (cash outflows)21 $23,438 $23,569 $23,430 $23,479 $27,652(a) $25,716(a) 
NPV of cash outflows22 $20,246 $20,359 $20,239 $20,281 $19,084 $17,748 
NPV of total cash flows23 $5,606  $5,493  $5,877  $5,658 $6,856 $8,192 
*H.I. Loan = Home Improvement Loan 
**H.E. Loan = Home Equity Loan  
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Notes:  
1. The numbers taken for the Home Improvement loan is the average of the three solar 
systems (Eclispall, Siliken and Heliene) for the respective line items. 
2. The numbers taken for the Home Equity Loan and LDC for the respective sections 
Specification, Costs and Energy Generation are averages of the three solar systems 
(Eclispall, Siliken and Heliene).  
3. The numbers for the Home Equity Loan and LDC for the section Cash Flows under 
the respective line items (MircoFit rooftop price/kWh for solar, Benefit under 
FiT/year, Benefit under FiT/month, Benefit under FiT (Cash inflows) and NPV of 
cash inflows) is the average of the three solar systems (Eclispall, Siliken and 
Heliene). 
4. For the LDC, in the costs section, a 15% discount has been added to the costs of 
panels, inverters, racking system, miscellaneous and labour. This discount has been 
added because the local energy company will have economies of scale. 
 
 
1 1kW = 1000W 
   5kW = 5000W 
This is the approximate size of system  
 
2(a) Actual cost of the Eclipsall 245W Polycrystalline Panel = $239.99 CAD  
 
 
2(b) Actual cost of the Siliken 245W Polycrystalline Panel = $245.00 CAD  
     
 
2(c) Actual cost of the Heliene 275W Polycrystalline Panel = $278.82 CAD 
 
3 Number of panels required  =  Approx. size 
           Wattage of module 
 
4 Exact size of the system =  (Exact number of panels required * Wattage of module) 
              1000 
 
5 Cost of panels  = Exact number of panels required * Cost of module 
 
6 The cost of an inverter and racking system for a 5kW solar system taken from Solar Trade 
(Solar Trader, 2014d) 
 
7 Since this cost would require the collection of primary data, the costs assigned here are 
for the most part arbitrary. However, many sources suggest that the cost of solar panels 
only account for approximately 20% of the total solar installation costs and average costs 
of a solar array of this size (including installations) is approximately $20,000 (NREL, 2013; 
Eco Alternative Energy, 2013; Paid4Power, 2014). Therefore, after accounting for other 
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costs that are available by conducting secondary research, I have allotted a conservative 
estimate for labour and other miscellaneous costs.  
Assumptions: 
(a)Labour 
The cost of labour per hour: $75 
Number of hours: 15 
Number of technicians: 3  
Total cost of labour = $75*15h*3 = $3,375 
(a)Other miscellaneous items 
Wires, mounting, connection fees, et cetera ~ $1,000 
 
(b) Labour 
The cost of labour per hour: $75 
Number of hours: 14 
Number of technicians: 3  
Total cost of labour = $75*14h*3 = $3,150 
 
8 (OPA, 2014) 
 
9 This figure includes the cost of a solar photovoltaic Connection Impact Assessment that 
the local distribution company is required to complete. This cost is taken from Toronto 
Hydro (Toronto Hydro, 2012) 
 
10 Harmonized Sales Tax is the sum of all costs multiplied by 13% 
 
11 Total costs = panels + inverter + racking system + labour + application fee (OPA + local 
energy company) + other miscellaneous costs +HST 
      
12 (Oxtoby, 2007) 
 
13 Optimal generation = avg. sunlight hours in Toronto/year *Actual size of system (kW) 
 
14 To calculate the average generation for a system of this size, a solar array system with 
real time data in the Toronto area has been examined. The size of this system is 2.07kW. 
The per year energy production for this system is as follows: 
2010 – 2,090kWh 
2011 – 1,874kWh 
2012 – 2,030kWh 
The average produced in the three years was 1,998kWh 
 
To calculate the costs of the 5kW system, the formulae below have been used: 
(a) = 1,998 * 4.9/2.07 = 4,729.6 
(b) = 1,998 * 4.95/2.07 = 4,777.8 
 
15 (OPA, 2014b)  
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16 Benefit under the FIT/year = microFIT rooftop price/kWh for solar * average generation 
 
17 Benefit under the FIT/month = Benefit under the FIT/year  
      12 
 
18 Benefit under the FIT (cash inflows) = Benefit under FIT/year * 20 years 
This amount represents the total cash inflow received under the benefits of the FIT 
program for the entire 20-year duration of the FIT contract. 
 
19 Refer to Appendix 2 
 
To calculate the present value of net benefits, the Present value interest factor of an annuity 
formula has been used (Deaves, 2009). 
 
k (1 month effective rate) = 1 + (.0399/2)1/6  – 1 = 0.0032911; 
n = 240 (months) 
PVIFA (.00329;240) = 1 – {1/(1+ .00329)240}/.00329 = $165.63 
 
NPV of cash inflows = PVIFA * Benefit of FIT/month 
 
 
20 k (1 month effective rate) = 1 + (.0599/2)1/6  – 1 = 0.00493;  
n = 60 (months)12 
PVIFA (.00493;60) = 1 – {1/(1+ .00493)60}/.00493 = $51.83 
 
(a) k (1 month effective rate) = 1 + (.0329/2)1/6  – 1 = 0.00273; 
n = 240 (months) 
PVIFA (.00273;240) = 1 – {1/(1+ . 00273)240}/.00273 = $176.03 
 
(b)k (1 month effective rate) = 1 + (.0399/2)1/6  – 1 = 0.003297; 
n = 240 (months) 
PVIFA (.003297;240) = 1 – {1/(1+ .003297)240}/.003297 = $165.63 
 
Funding payments per month = Total upfront costs / PIVFA of the monthly payout  
 
21 Funding costs (cash outflows) = Funding payments per month * 60 months 
 
(a)Funding costs (cash outflows) = Funding payments per month * 240 months 
 
22 NPV of cash outflows = funding payments per month * PIVFA of the monthly payout 
Discount rate assumption: 5-year = 5.99%; 20-year = 3.99% based on current interest rates 
 
23 Net present value (NPV) of total cash flows = NPV of cash outflows - NPV of cash inflows  
                                                        
11In Canada, the interest rate is compounded semi-annually (Deaves, 2009). 
1260 months is used because the loan is for 5 years 
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Appendix 2 – Solar project funding costs 
 
Eclipsall 
 
Month1 Remaining 
Principal2 
 Interest 
Amount3 
 Principal 
Amount4  
 Monthly 
Payment  
1 $20,246   99.68   290.95   390.63  
2 19955.03451  98.24   292.38   390.63  
3 19662.65259  96.81   293.82   390.63  
4 19368.83118  95.36   295.27   390.63  
5 19073.5632  93.91   296.72   390.63  
6 18776.84152  92.44   298.18   390.63  
7 18478.65898  90.98   299.65   390.63  
8 18179.0084  89.50   301.13   390.63  
9 17877.88254  88.02   302.61   390.63  
10 17575.27415  86.53   304.10   390.63  
55 2298.426402  11.32   379.31   390.63  
56 1919.115443  9.45   381.18   390.63  
57 1537.937017  7.57   383.06   390.63  
58 1154.88193  5.69   384.94   390.63  
59 769.9409416  3.79   386.84   390.63  
60 383.1047679  1.89   388.74   390.63  
 
 
Interest rate – 5.99%5 
Average monthly payment - $390.63  
Total funding cost - $23,437.616 
 
Assumption: 
a) Zero-downpayment if home mortgage has been secured by the same bank (Solar 
Trader, 2013e) 
 
1 5 year loan = 60 months 
2 Month 1: Loaned amount 
   Month 2 onwards: Remaining principal of previous month – Principal amount of previous 
month    
3 Interest Amount = Remaining principal*5.99% 
(365/30) 
4 Principal Amount = Monthly payment – Interest Amount 
5 (Solar Trader, 2013e) 
6 Total monthly payments for 60 months 
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Siliken 
 
Month1 
Remaining 
Principal2 
 Interest 
Amount3  
 Principal 
Amount4  
 Monthly 
Payment  
1 $20,359   100.23   292.58   392.81  
2 20066.63337  98.79   294.02   392.81  
3 19772.6163  97.35   295.46   392.81  
4 19477.15169  95.89   296.92   392.81  
5 19180.23242  94.43   298.38   392.81  
6 18881.85131  92.96   299.85   392.81  
7 18582.00119  91.49   301.33   392.81  
8 18280.6748  90.00   302.81   392.81  
9 17977.86489  88.51   304.30   392.81  
10 17673.56416  87.01   305.80   392.81  
55 2311.280389  11.38   381.43   392.81  
56 1929.848128  9.50   383.31   392.81  
57 1546.537955  7.61   385.20   392.81  
58 1161.340626  5.72   387.09   392.81  
59 774.246849  3.81   389.00   392.81  
60 385.2472877  1.90   390.91   392.81  
Interest rate – 5.99%5 
Average monthly payment - $392.81 
Total funding cost - $23,568.696 
 
Assumptions: 
a) Zero-downpayment if home mortgage has been secured by the same bank (Solar 
Trader, 2013e) 
  
1 5 year loan = 60 months 
2 Month 1: Loaned amount 
   Month 2 onwards: Remaining principal of previous month – Principal amount of previous 
month    
3 Interest Amount = Remaining principal*5.99% 
(365/30) 
4 Principal Amount = Monthly payment – Interest Amount 
5 (Solar Trader, 2013e) 
6 Total monthly payments for 60 months 
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Heliene 
 
Month1 
Remaining 
Principal2 
 Interest 
Amount3  
 Principal 
Amount4  
 Monthly 
Payment  
1 $20,239   99.64   290.85   390.50  
2 19948.3074  98.21   292.28   390.50  
3 19656.02404  96.77   293.72   390.50  
4 19362.30168  95.33   295.17   390.50  
5 19067.13324  93.87   296.62   390.50  
6 18770.51158  92.41   298.08   390.50  
7 18472.42957  90.95   299.55   390.50  
8 18172.88  89.47   301.02   390.50  
9 17871.85566  87.99   302.51   390.50  
10 2674.976967  13.17   377.33   390.50  
55 2297.651571  11.31   379.18   390.50  
56 1918.468483  9.45   381.05   390.50  
57 1537.418557  7.57   382.93   390.50  
58 1154.492603  5.68   384.81   390.50  
59 769.6813839  3.79   386.71   390.50  
60 382.975618  1.89   388.61   390.50  
Interest rate – 5.99%5 
Average monthly payment - $390.50 
Total funding cost - $23,429.716 
 
Assumptions: 
a) Zero-downpayment if home mortgage has been secured by the same bank (Solar 
Trader, 2013e) 
  
1 5 year loan = 60 months 
2 Month 1: Loaned amount 
   Month 2 onwards: Remaining principal of previous month – Principal amount of previous 
month    
3 Interest Amount = Remaining principal*5.99% 
(365/30) 
4 Principal Amount = Monthly payment – Interest Amount 
5 (Solar Trader, 2013e) 
6 Total monthly payments for 60 months 
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Home Equity Loan 
 
Month1 Remaining 
Principal2 
 Interest 
Amount3 
 Principal 
Amount4  
 Monthly 
Payment  
1  20,281.45   54.84   60.37  115.22 
2  20,221.08   54.68   60.54  115.22 
3  20,160.54   54.52   60.70  115.22 
4  20,099.84   54.35   60.86  115.22 
5  20,038.97   54.19   61.03  115.22 
6  19,977.94   54.02   61.19  115.22 
7  19,916.75   53.86   61.36  115.22 
8  19,855.39   53.69   61.53  115.22 
9  19,793.86   53.53   61.69  115.22 
234  720.48   1.95   113.27  115.22 
235  607.21   1.64   113.58  115.22 
236  493.63   1.33   113.88  115.22 
237  379.75   1.03   114.19  115.22 
238  265.56   0.72   114.50  115.22 
239  151.06   0.41   114.81  115.22 
240  36.25   0.10   115.12  115.22 
 
 
Interest rate – 3.29% 
Average monthly payment - $115.22  
Total funding cost - $25,652.195 
 
 
1 20 year loan = 240 months 
2 Month 1: Loaned amount 
   Month 2 onwards: Remaining principal of previous month – Principal amount of previous 
month    
3 Interest Amount = Remaining principal*3.29% 
(365/30) 
4 Principal Amount = Monthly payment – Interest Amount 
5 Total monthly payments for 240 months 
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Local Distribution Company model 
 
Month1 Remaining 
Principal2 
 Interest 
Amount3 
 Principal 
Amount4  
 Monthly 
Payment  
1 $17,748                    58.20                    48.95          107.15  
2 17698.78822                   58.04                    49.11          107.15  
3 17649.68263                   57.88                    49.27          107.15  
4 17600.416                   57.72                    49.43          107.15  
5 17550.98781                   57.56                    49.59          107.15  
6 17501.39751                   57.40                    49.75          107.15  
7 17451.64459                   57.23                    49.92          107.15  
8 17401.7285                   57.07                    50.08          107.15  
9 17351.64872                   56.90                    50.24          107.15  
234 667.7098309                     2.19                  104.96          107.15  
235 562.7513325                     1.85                  105.30          107.15  
236 457.4486259                     1.50                  105.65          107.15  
237 351.8005822                     1.15                  105.99          107.15  
238 245.8060689                     0.81                  106.34          107.15  
239 139.4639497                     0.46                  106.69          107.15  
240 32.77308482                     0.11                  107.04          107.15  
 
 
Interest rate – 3.99% 
Average monthly payment - $107.15  
Total funding cost - $25,715.585 
 
 
1 20 year loan = 240 months 
2 Month 1: Loaned amount 
   Month 2 onwards: Remaining principal of previous month – Principal amount of previous 
month    
3 Interest Amount = Remaining principal*3.99% 
(365/30) 
4 Principal Amount = Monthly payment – Interest Amount 
5 Total monthly payments for 240 months 
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